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THE CRAZY MAZE OF FOOD LABELING 
AND FOOD CLAIMS LAWS 
PATRICK MEYER† 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a de facto right in America to know what contents 
make up the food we consume.1  The United States Department 
of Agriculture (“USDA”) regulates food labels and label claims 
made on meat, poultry, and egg products,2 and the United States 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulates the labeling 
and labeling claims on all other foods.3  The mission of the FDA 
is to protect the health of the public.4 
The FDA has the monumental task of identifying and 
remedying unsubstantiated product claims.  Consider the various 
teas sold at cancerherbtea.com, which touted their ability to heal 
cancer and dozens of similar claims as described in a recent FDA 
Warning Letter.5  Some of the unsubstantiated claims included: 
“Cancer Herb Tea ‘You have nothing to lose but your cancer,’ ” 
“Proven to help kill the cancer cells, try out the natural herbal 
 
† Library Director & Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy 
School of Law. I am thankful to the editorial staff of the St. John’s Law Review for 
their substantial work editing this article, to my colleague Catherine Archibald for 
her extensive comments on the draft article, and colleagues Richard Broughton and 
Kyle Langvardt for their expertise on constitutional law. I am also grateful to 
Professor Emily Broad Leib for her comments on the original draft. 
1 MICHAEL T. ROBERTS, FOOD LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 254 (2016). Roberts 
notes that although it is not expressly stated in U.S. law, the concept of the 
consumer’s right to know the contents in food is apparent when one considers the 
increased consumer demand for food information. Id. 
2 U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food and Safety Inspection Serv., Labeling/Label 
Approval, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/regulatory-compliance/labe 
ling (last updated Dec. 16, 2016); ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 208. 
3 What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194879.htm (last updated Aug. 7, 2018); 
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 208. 
4 What We Do, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ 
WhatWeDo/default.htm (last updated March 28, 2018). 
5 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Warning Letter on cancerherbtea.com (Feb. 26, 
2015) https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2015/ucm435 
681.htm. 
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remedy which is successfully battling the disease!,” and “help[s] 
reduce and kill bad cancer cells but also helps with . . . diabetes, 
insomnia, arthritis, [and] reduces fever . . . .”6  Another time-
consuming responsibility of the FDA is monitoring the marketing 
of powerful drugs as dietary supplements.  For instance, the FDA 
recently sent a Warning Letter to Andropharm, LLC because the 
company did not have the required FDA pre-approval to market 
its dietary supplement that contained synthetic steroids.7  The 
FDA noted that anabolic steroids could cause serious health 
consequences, including “liver toxicity, testicular atrophy and 
male infertility, breast enlargement in males, short stature in 
children, adverse effects on blood lipid levels, and a potential to 
increase the risk of heart attack and stroke.”8  This Article 
critiques the role of the FDA in providing consumers with 
accurate and relevant food label information, identifies 
impediments in the pursuit of its mission, and offers solutions to 
those impediments. 
Part I of this Article traces the history of U.S. food labeling 
and health claims laws.  Current food laws and their regulation 
have developed over time.  The first federal legislation was 
passed in the early 1900s.  The food laws of today have certainly 
been influenced by past food laws, which were largely a reaction 
to societal events.  A brief summary of the historical development 
of our nation’s important food laws should serve to illustrate this 
point.  Next, Part II demonstrates the significant hurdles that 
prevent the FDA from fulfilling its mission of consumer safety.  
The FDA has too many regulations to enforce, too many products 
and establishments to keep up with, and not enough staff or 
funding to adequately do either.  Currently, supplement 
manufactures are not required to submit safety evidence before 
selling products.9  Therefore, the FDA does not investigate safety 
issues until becoming aware of a widespread health concern.  The 
 
6 Id. (omission in original).  
7 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Warning Letter on Andropharm, LLC (June 5, 
2017) https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2017/ucm56 
1975.htm. 
8 Id. 
9 Maggie Dickens, Comment, Safe Until Proven Unsafe: Solving the Growing 
Debate Around Dietary Supplement Regulation, 15 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. 
PROP. L. 576, 577–89 (2015); Natalie R. Bilbrough, Comment, The FDA, Congress, 
and Mobile Health Apps: Lessons from DSHEA and the Regulation of Dietary 
Supplements, 74 MD. L. REV. 921, 944–46 (2015); Andrea M. Pezzullo, Note, The 
Crusade Against Misleading Labels, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 323, 338 (2016). 
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administrative hurdles are not internal to the FDA.  The FDA is 
one of several agencies responsible for the regulation of food, and 
there are differing rules and key term definitions between agency 
regulations.  Having varying rules and term definitions makes 
for conflicting laws and consumer confusion. 
Part III reviews studies on the effectiveness of food labels 
and health claims, as well as how the courts have treated health 
claims.  Finally, Part IV argues that food and nutrition 
supplement laws should be streamlined.  Although several 
authors ably identify solutions for how this may be accomplished, 
the sheer number of solutions that have been posited over the 
past several years is too plentiful to reasonably implement.  
Therefore, this Article suggests a combination of a few solutions 
that, taken together, are manageable implementations, which 
will maximize positive change in food law protections.  The 
proposed improvements to food laws will be limited to 
establishing a simple mandatory front-of-package labeling 
scheme that will include: (1) eliminating structure/function 
claims; (2) greatly revising and simplifying nutrition content 
claims laws; (3) having the FDA issue letter grades for products 
based on evidence of health claims while allowing agreed-on 
health claims language to appear on the label; and (4) deferring 
to the expertise of the FDA in the courts. 
I. HISTORY OF U.S. FOOD LABEL LAWS & HEALTH CLAIMS 
Congress first recognized the need to protect citizens 
purchasing food by passing the first national legislative act 
relating to food law, the Pure Food and Drug Act, in 1906.10  The 
Act prohibited adulterated foods or drugs and false and 
misleading statements describing the overall identity of the 
product, but did not require the listing of specific ingredients or 
nutritional content.11  Congress amended the Pure Food and 
 
10 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 210; Pure Food Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 
768 (1906) (repealed 1938). 
11 §§ 1-13, 34 Stat. at 768–72; ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 210–11; Jason M. 
Szanyi, Brain Food: Bringing Psychological Insights to Bear on Modern Nutrition 
Labeling Efforts, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 159, 159 (2010); Josh Dhyani, Science-Based 
Food Labels: Improving Regulations & Preventing Consumer Deception Through 
Limited Information Disclosure Requirements, 26 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 7 (2016). 
The Act defined a drug product as being “adulterated” if it lacked the typical 
“standard of strength, quality, or purity.” § 7, 34 Stat. at 769. A food product was 
considered to be “adulterated” if the strength of the product was diluted by additives 
or if a critical component of the food had been replaced by an inferior substance or 
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Drug Act in 1912 to address drug product claims and impute 
liability to manufacturers for false claims as to “the curative or 
therapeutic effect” of the product or any of its ingredients.12  The 
1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) added a 
definition for “labeling” to U.S. food laws, which included graphic 
or written matter affixed to or shipped with a product.13 
In 1966, Congress passed the Fair Packaging and Labeling 
Act, establishing the requirements of net quantity content 
labeling, label placement, label format standards, the 
requirement that the manufacturer be listed on the label, and 
forbidding nonfunctional “slack-fill,” where there is substantially 
less of a product relative to the size of the package.14  A 
subsequent regulation, enacted in 1973, augmented the Fair 
Packaging and Labeling Act by requiring full nutrition labeling if 
a manufacturer included any nutritional information, made a 
nutrition claim, or added “vitamin[s], mineral[s], or protein[s]” to 
the food.15 
 
abstracted from the food. Id. at 769–70. A food product was said to be misbranded if, 
inter alia, a statement about the product was “false or misleading.” Intent to deceive 
was a requirement for a finding of liability. Id. at 770–71. The law gave the 
government the authority to chemically test food but the burden of proof fell on the 
government. Id. at 769. Section 4 of the Act stated that chemical examinations of 
food and drug product are to be made in order to identify adulterated or misbranded 
food. Id. 
12 An Act to Amend Section Eight of the Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 62–
301, 37 Stat. 416–17 (1912). 
13 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75–717, § 1, 52 Stat. 1040–
41 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)); ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 211. This 
Act kept the food testing provision from the Pure Food and Drug Act, but added a 
provision for factory and transport vehicle inspections. 52 Stat. at 1056–57. 
14 Dhyani, supra note 11, at 14; Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 
89–755, 80 Stat. 1296–99 (1966). The definition of misrepresentation includes the 
representation or implication that a product was offered “at a price lower than the 
ordinary and customary retail sale price or that a . . . price advantage is 
accorded . . . by reason of the size of that package or the quantity of its contents.” § 5, 
80 Stat. at 1299. 
15 Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
and the Fair Package and Labeling Act, 38 Fed. Reg. 6951, 6959–61 (Mar. 14, 1973) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1). If “vitamin[s], mineral[s], or protein[s]” were added 
to the food, then serving size, servings per container, calories, protein, carbohydrate, 
fat, and percentage of recommended daily allowances had to be added to the label. 
Id. at 6959–60. If cholesterol information was included on the label, full nutritional 
labeling was required. Id. at 6962; see also id. at 6952. The regulation stated that a 
product could not claim to be a “significant source” of a nutrient unless it contained 
at least ten percent of the Recommended Dietary Allowance per serving, and could 
not claim to be “nutritionally superior” to another product unless there was at least 
10 percent more of the nutrient in the product per serving. Id. at 6960. 
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Congress responded to the need for consistent food labeling 
by passing the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 
(“NLEA”), which created mandatory food labeling requirements 
and qualified nutrient claim parameters.16  The NLEA required 
certain nutritional facts including calories, serving size, number 
of servings per container, total fat, total calories, saturated fat, 
cholesterol, sugars, and sodium be displayed on all food 
products.17  The NLEA also forbade nutrition content claims if 
the term was not already defined by the FDA.18  Further, the 
NLEA restricted the use of health claims in marketing and 
branding unless the FDA had issued a regulation allowing the 
claim.19  In 1997, the FDA began to allow health claims if a 
scientific body of the government had published an “authoritative 
statement” in support of the claim.20 
In an effort to provide citizens with more useful information 
regarding dietary supplements,21 Congress amended the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, with the Dietary Supplement 
Health and Education Act of 1994 (“DSHEA”).22  Under the 
DSHEA, the burden to prove that a supplement is adulterated or 
 
16 Camille Currey, Note, Despite What You’ve Been Sold – Unwrapping the 
Falsities Surrounding Food Labels, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 1279, 1293 (2016); ROBERTS, 
supra note 1, at 231; Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
535, 104 Stat. 2353,  2357-61 (1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)); Dhyani, 
supra note 11, at 16–17. 
17 § 2, 104 Stat. at 2353. However, food sold at restaurants was exempt from the 
NLEA. See § 2, 104 Stat. at 2355. 
18 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 231; § 2, 104 Stat. at 2357–58. 
19 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 231; § 3, 104 Stat. at 2357, 2359–60. 
20 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 231–32 (citing § 343 of the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296, 
2350–51). In addition, the NLEA required the FDA to define the terms “free,” “low,” 
“light,” “reduced,” “less,” and “high.” § 2, 104 Stat. at 2361. These terms were defined 
in the final regulation Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, 
Petitions, Definition of Terms. Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General 
Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms, Definitions of Nutrient Content Claims for 
the Fat, Fatty Acid, and Cholesterol Content of Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2412 (Jan. 
6, 1993) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pts. 5, 101). 
21 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 322; see also, Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 
58 Fed. Reg. 33690, 33691 (June 18, 1993) (The Dietary Supplement Task Force was 
established in May of 1991 to review dietary supplement rules, in part because of 
two significant public health outbreaks related to the use of dietary supplements. In 
May of 1992, the task force submitted its report, identifying “the safety of 
ingredients in dietary supplements as the overriding concern for FDA as it develops 
a regulatory framework to distinguish among dietary supplement products.”). 
22 Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 
108 Stat. 4325 (1994). 
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contains false or misleading labeling shifts to the FDA.23  The 
DSHEA only applies to supplements that contain ingredients 
first marketed after October 14, 1994.24  The DSHEA allows 
product removal proceedings to commence only if it is determined 
that the claim rises to the stratospheric level of being an 
“imminent hazard to public health or safety.”25  The DSHEA 
allows supplement manufacturers to make a nutrition claim 
provided they include a disclaimer stating that the FDA had not 
evaluated the claim.26 
In order to increase consumer safety,27 in 2006, Congress 
amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act with the 
Dietary Supplement and Nonprescription Drug Consumer 
Protection Act.28  Section 3 of the amended act requires dietary 
supplement manufacturers to submit reports of “serious adverse 
event[s]” to the FDA.29  The Act defines a “Serious [A]dverse 
[E]vent” as an event leading to death, hospitalization, a “life-
threatening experience,” “persistent or significant disability or 
incapacity,” “a congenital anomaly or birth defect,” or which 
requires medical intervention.30  This system is necessary 
because U.S. law treats nutritional supplements as food and not 
medication, so there is no need to prove safety or effectiveness 
before a product enters the market.31  The FDA does not 
investigate health concerns unless there are enough reported 
“serious adverse events.”32  However, even though reporting is 
required, it is estimated that only two percent of serious adverse 
 
23 Id. at 4328-29. 
24 Id. at 4331-32; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 946. 
25 § 4, 108 Stat. at 4328; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 946. 
26 § 4, 108 Stat. at 4329; see also Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 948. 
27 S. REP. NO. 109–324, at 1–2 (2006) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2006 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1841, 1841–42. 
28 Dietary Supplement and Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 109–462, 120 Stat. 3469 (2006). 
29 Id. at 3472–73. 
30 Id. 
31 Rick Schmitt, Supplement Pills That Promise Too Much, AARP BULLETIN 
(June 2016), https://www.aarp.org/health/drugs-supplements/info-2016/drug-vitamin 
-supplement-claims.html. 
32 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 326–27. Because there is no pre-approval required 
for food, “the FDA relies on the adverse event reporting system” to identify product 
safety issues. Id. at 326; FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS): Latest 
Quarterly Data Files, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Guid 
anceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/AdverseDrugEffects/ucm08219
3.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2018). 
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events were reported to the FDA.33  The FDA also does not pre-
approve food labels for nutritional content accuracy.34  Instead, 
the FDA spot checks manufacturers after consumer complaints 
are lodged.35 
Several types of claims can be advertised on packaging 
labels.  First, “structure/function claims” are allowed to describe 
the role an ingredient plays in the “normal structure or function 
of the human body.”36  Nutrition content claims, which state the 
nutritional makeup of the product, are allowed as long as the 
FDA has defined the ingredient.37  Third, “health claims” state 
that the product reduces the chances of obtaining a disease or 
alleviates a health condition.38  If there is some credible evidence 
to support the health claim, but not to the level that satisfies a 
significant scientific agreement standard, then an FDA crafted 
disclaimer that qualifies the claim must appear on the product 
label.39  This is called a “Qualified Health Claim.”40  Since the 
early 2000s, courts have required the FDA to issue carefully 
worded disclaimers for qualified health claims, instead of 
categorically denying them.41  Unqualified health claims or 
authorized health claims are approved by the FDA if they meet 
the high evidentiary standard of significant scientific 
agreement.42  According to the FDA:  
 
33 Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 949 (citing Richard Potomac, Are You Sure You 
Want to Eat That?: U.S. Government and Private Regulation of Domestically 
Produced and Marketed Dietary Supplements, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 54, 66 
(2010)). 
34 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 212; Lisa Heinzerling, The Varieties and Limits of 
Transparency in U.S. Food Law, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 11, 18 (2015). 
35 ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 212. 
36 Structure/Function Claims, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ 
Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm2006881.htm (last updated Dec. 14, 2017) [hereinafter 
Structure/Function Claims]. An example of a “structure/function claim” is “calcium 
builds strong bones.” Id. 
37 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101–535, 104 Stat. 
2353, 2357–58 (1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343). 
38 Label Claims for Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements, U.S. FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm111447.htm 
(last updated June 19, 2018) [hereinafter Label Claims]; Question and Answers on 
Health Claims in Food Labeling, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/ 
Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm207974.htm (last updated Dec. 13, 2017). 
39 Questions and Answers on Health Claims in Food Labeling, supra note 38. 
40 Id. 
41 See infra Part III.C. 
42 See Authorized Health Claims That Meet The Significant Scientific Agreement 
(SSA) Standard, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Food/Labeling 
Nutrition/ucm2006876.htm (last updated Jan, 12, 2018). 
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To be approved by the FDA as an authorized health claim, there 
must be significant scientific agreement (“SSA”) among 
qualified experts that the claim is supported by the totality of 
publicly available scientific evidence for a substance/disease 
relationship.  The SSA standard is intended to be a strong 
standard that provides a high level of confidence in the validity 
of the substance/disease relationship.43 
II. PROBLEMS WITH U.S. FOOD LAW GOVERNANCE 
There are estimated to be between 50,000 and 100,000 
dietary supplements currently being sold.44  The number of 
supplements for the FDA to monitor, combined with the lack of 
pre-approval laws, causes investigations into health-related 
claims to commence after too many people have been injured 
because the FDA relies on consumer reports through the adverse 
event system.45  When regulators obtain convictions for illegal 
behavior, the penalty is often a civil fine that, although 
substantial, still pales in comparison to the money that is made 
because of the false claims.46  For example, Dannon recently 
claimed that its Activia yogurt regulates digestion and its 
DanActive drink helps prevent the flu and colds.47  In 2010, The 
FTC reached a $21 million settlement with Dannon.48  In the 
meantime, it is suspected that Dannon made more than that 
amount49 in the $3.7 billion U.S. Greek yogurt market.50 
 
43 Id. (citation omitted); see also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for 
Industry: Evidence-Based Review System For the Scientific Evaluation of Human 
Claims,  
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInfor
mation/ucm073332.htm (last updated Sept. 19, 2018). This document provides a full 
explanation of the evidentiary standard used by the FDA. 
44 Schmitt, supra note 31. 
45 Id. 
46 Id.; Dickens, supra note 9, at 587 (noting that “[t]he economic growth of the 
industry due to the ability to escape regulations is too large for miniscule 
settlements to deter the industry from changing its own practices.”). 
47 Currey, supra note 16, at 1279-80; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Dannon Agrees to Drop Exaggerated Health Claims for Activia Yogurt and 
DanActive Dairy Drink (Dec. 15, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2010/12/dannon-agrees-drop-exaggerated-health-claims-activia-yogurt. 
48 Bailey Mosier, Dannon Fined $21M for False Marketing, EMPOWHER (Dec. 
16, 2010), http://www.empowher.com/healthy-eating/content/dannon-fined-21m-false 
-marketing?page=0,0. 
49 Currey, supra note 16, at 1279–80. See generally Schmitt, supra note 31. 
Paying a large fine is a minor cost of doing business. 
50 U.S. Greek Yogurt Market – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/topics/2351/greek-yogurt/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2018). 
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The dietary supplement industry is very large and has its 
share of false advertising claims.  A senior attorney for AARP 
Foundation Litigation stated that the cost of supplements sold 
with inaccurate claims is in the billions of dollars.51  The 
potential profits incentivize companies to keep marketing their 
products in the same way and treat government fines as the “cost 
of doing business.”52  Further, even after issuing fines, the FTC 
sometimes permits a company to market a product with a new 
message that can still seem to be misleading.  For example, CVS 
Pharmacy, Walmart, Walgreens, Rite Aid, and others sold 
BrainStrong Adult with DHA, an ingredient that marketers 
promoted as “[c]linically shown to improve adult memory.”53  A 
2014 FTC Consent Order forbid the manufacturers from making 
any representation, either explicitly or implicitly, that their 
products “improve[] memory in adults” or “prevent[] cognitive 
decline . . . in adults” without “reliable scientific evidence.”54  
However, one of the successor manufacturers of BrainStrong 
Adult subsequently offered a similar product for sale, and 
marketed the product with claims of “pure DHA for memory 
support.”55  The change from using the phrase “improves memory 
in adults” to “memory support” seems to violate the 2014 FTC 
order that forbade implied claims of memory enhancement.56  
Two subsequent class action lawsuits against CVS will determine 
if similar advertising is acceptable as it pertains to another of 
their products containing DHA.57  The product is still being sold 
with the new message intact.58 
 
 
51 Schmitt, supra note 31. 
52 Id. 
53 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Supplement Marketers Settle FTC Charges 
that “BrainStrong Adult” Memory Improvement Claims Are Deceptive (June 9, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/06/supplement-marketers-
settle-ftc-charges-brainstrong-adult-memory. 
54 Id.; I-Health, Inc., F.T.C. 1, 3 (2014), 2014 WL 4252391. 
55 Short Memory Lands CVS Brain Supplement in Legal Trouble, TRUTH IN 
ADVERTISING (June 7, 2016), https://www.truthinadvertising.org/memory-lands-cvs-
supplement-in-trouble/. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 CVS Health Algal-900 DHA Softgels, CVS PHARMACY, https://www.cvs.com/shop/cvs-
health-algal-900-dha-softgels-prodid-1070656?skuId=794904 (last visited Sept. 28, 
2018). 
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The marketers of the popular supplement Prevagen are 
making similar memory claims.59  Further, the Prevagen 
television commercial states that it is “clinically proven to 
improve short term memory.”60  Prevagen states that a “double-
blinded, placebo-controlled trial,” which is detailed on its 
website,61 supports their claims even though they note the FDA 
did not review the statement.62  The experiment in question, 
named the Madison Study, consisted of 218 subjects with “self-
reported memory concerns.”63  The manufacturer of Prevagen, 
Quincy Bioscience, sponsored the study.64  Quantitative tests 
were administered at five intervals during the ninety-day 
period.65  The results showed that “Prevagen demonstrated the 
ability to improve aspects of cognitive function in older 
participants with either normal cognitive aging or very mild 
impairment.”66  There are two major concerns with the 
methodology. First, there are concerns of bias because the study 
was sponsored by the manufacturer.  Second, the participants 
have “self-reported memory concerns” as opposed to medically 
documented memory concerns. 
FDA administrators admit the disadvantages they face in 
their ability to catch false advertisements.67  Recent examples of 
the scope of false advertising include claims that Amberen would 
 
59 TINA.org to FTC: Prevagen is Making Unsupported Memory Claims, TRUTH 
IN ADVERTISING (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.truthinadvertising.org/prevagen-ftc-
complaint/; Madison Memory Study: A Randomized, Double-Blinded, Placebo-
Controlled Trial of Apoaequorin in Community-Dwelling, Older Adults, QUINCY 
BIOSCIENCE (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.prevagen.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 
02/ClinicalTrialSynopsis-cmk816.pdf [hereinafter Madison Memory Study].  
60 This author first noted watching the commercial on the CNN channel on 
Tuesday morning, August 2, 2016 and has seen it on air through February 2018. The 
commercial noted it was available at CVS. 
61 Madison Memory Study, supra note 59, at 1. 
62 PREVAGEN, https://www.prevagen.com (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
63 Madison Memory Study, supra note 59, at 4. 
64 Id. at 1. 
65 Id. at 2–3. 
66 Id. at 9. 
67 Michael Taylor, How the FDA is Picking Its Food Label Battles, THE 
ATLANTIC (July 19, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2010/07/how-
the-fda-is-picking-its-food-label-battles/59927/. Taylor, then Deputy Commissioner 
for Foods at the FDA, noted that the FDA is forced to pick its battles concerning 
marketing claims, stating “[w]e have no pre-market review authority over such 
claims, and, under prevailing legal doctrines concerning ‘commercial free speech,’ 
the evidentiary requirements placed on FDA to prove that such claims are 
misleading are significant and costly to meet. Moreover, meeting them requires 
tapping the same team of nutritionists, labeling experts, and lawyers who are 
working on our other nutrition initiatives.” Id. See also infra Part IV.C. 
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relieve symptoms of menopause,68 a product claiming it prevents 
gray hair,69 that the health benefits of Eukanuba dog food were 
scientifically proven,70 and that POM Wonderful’s Pomegranate 
Juice and POMx supplements “could treat, prevent, or reduce the 
risk of heart disease, prostate cancer, and erectile dysfunction, 
and were clinically proven to have such benefits.”71 
A. Problems Related to the FDA 
The problems with the FDA and its regulatory ability have 
been widely written about and many of the articles are 
summarized below. 
The FDA has too much to regulate.  Considering the health 
supplement portion of the FDA’s duties alone shows how 
inadequately the FDA is staffed.  Over half of the U.S. population 
take health supplements.72  The FDA must also regulate over 
500,000 food products, “tens of thousands” of companies, and 
scores of new products that are introduced each year in the U.S. 
market.73   In addition, there are reportedly over 1,000 food 
additives on the FDA substance inventory list that they have not 
investigated.74  However, the Center for Food Safety and Applied 
Nutrition within the FDA, which is in charge of nutrition, 
 
68 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Marketers of Dietary Supplement 
Amberen Settle FTC Charges Regarding Misleading Weight-Loss and Menopause 
Relief Claims (May 20, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/ 
2016/05/marketers-dietary-supplement-amberen-settle-ftc-charges-regarding. 
69 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Challenges Markters’ Baseless 
Claims That Their Supplements Prevent or Reverse Gray Hair (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-challenges-marketers-
baseless-claims-their-supplements. 
70 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges 
that Mars Petcare Made False Health Claims for Its Eukanuba Brand Dog Food (Dec. 13, 
2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/12/ftc-approves-final-
order-settling-charges-mars-petcare-made-false. 
71 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of FTC Chairwoman Edith 
Ramirez Regarding Supreme Court’s Decision Not to Review POM Wonderful Case 
(May 2, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/05/statement-ftc-
chairwoman-edith-ramirez-regarding-supreme-courts. 
72 Madison Park, Half of Americans Use Supplements, CNN (Apr. 13, 2011), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/04/13/supplements.dietary/index.html. 
73 See Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 15. 
74 Brett M. Paben, Lack of Interest in Consumer Interests: FDA’s Narrow 
Perspective on Food Labeling and Label Statements Undermines a Century of Agency 
Leadership, 13 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 174, 186 (2015) (citing the Substances 
Added to Foods list, formerly called Everything Added to Food in the United States 
(EAFUS) at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/fcn/fcnnavigation.cfm?rpt=eafus 
listing). 
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labeling, and dietary supplements, has just over 1,000 
employees,75 raising the issue of how consumers are to stay safe 
(make healthy choices/know what they are eating) if the FDA 
cannot keep up.76 
Further, some authors view the FDA as a reactionary body 
since it has stopped random sampling of foods, and since there 
are limited pre-market approval requirements.77  There is no pre-
market approval requirement for dietary supplements except for 
products that contain ingredients first marketed after October 
14, 1994, and there is no scientific testing requirement at all.78  
When the FDA last conducted random sampling twenty years 
ago, it found that between 30% and 50% of all 300 products 
tested listed some vitamin amounts on the Nutrition Facts panel 
that substantially differed from the actual amounts.79 
The FDA’s authority has been eroded by recent court 
decisions.  Traditionally, the courts gave the FDA the highest 
deference in interpreting its regulations, but this is no longer the 
case for product claims.80  Although the FDA creates its own 
procedures and rules,81 fewer than half of consumers feel that the 
FDA provides adequate information on food content.82 
 
 
75 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 
DISTRIBUTION OF FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT (FTE) EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM LEVEL, 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetRep
orts/UCM301553.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2018).  
76 Paben, supra note 74, at 186. 
77 Dickens, supra note 9, at 577–78 (“[R]egulations covering dietary 
supplements are somewhat laxed.”). Dickens goes on to state as examples that 
dietary supplements require no pre-market approval and that they are presumed 
safe until the FDA is alerted to an issue. Id. Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 944–47 
(noting that the “FDA now has a purely reactionary role” because there is no pre-
market approval for dietary supplements unless they contain a new ingredient. 
Further, the FDA has very high burden of proof when investigating a potentially 
harmful product); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD LABELING: FDA 
NEEDS TO BETTER LEVERAGE RESOURCES, IMPROVE OVERSIGHT, AND EFFECTIVELY 
USE AVAILABLE DATA TO HELP CONSUMERS SELECT HEALTHY FOODS 17 (2008). 
78 Dickens, supra note 9, at 577-80; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 944–46; 
Pezzullo, supra note 9, at 338. 
79 Id. The FDA characterizes this substantial difference to be outside the 
allowable range. Id.; see also Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 17. 
80 Paben, supra note 74, at 205–06 (referencing Auer Deference, per the case 
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)); see also infra Part III.C. 
81 Paben, supra note 74, at 174. 
82 Id. at 176–77 (citing INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL 
FOUNDATION, 2014 FOOD AND HEALTH SURVEY (2014)). 
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The FDA does not investigate a supplement until notified of 
a problem.83  Due to their limited resources, the FDA must 
prioritize which complaints to pursue, which often means taking 
action on products for which the most claims have been made.84  
Further, unlike the prescription industry, dietary supplement 
manufacturers are not required to submit evidence of safety via 
clinical trials to the FDA before their products are offered for 
sale.85  Additionally, the FDA sees itself as only being able to act 
on “proven health and safety risks,” which precludes it from 
taking any proactive measures.86  For all of these reasons, the 
FDA is considered a reactionary force, as opposed to a proactive 
agency.87 
Some authors believe the problem with the FDA and other 
agencies tasked with regulating food is the regulatory 
fragmentation caused by the different missions, cultures, and 
regulations of these agencies, and because of manufacturer 
influence.88  An example of regulatory fragmentation is that the 
USDA requires pre-approval of product labels but the FDA does 
not.89  Another source of fragmentation is the number of agencies 
with the power to regulate food laws.  In 2011, the Government 
Accountability Office reported that there were fifteen agencies 
with the authority to regulate food safety.90 
 
83 Dickens, supra note 9, at 578. 
84 Taylor, supra note 67 (noting how incredibly difficult and fruitless it is to go 
after companies and their teams of creative marketers). 
85 Dickens, supra note 9, at 580–81. 
86 Melissa Mortazavi, Tort As Democracy: Lessons From the Food Wars, 57 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 929, 942 (2015) (citing All. for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 
179 (D.D.C. 2000)). 
87 Dickens, supra note 9, at 577–78; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 946; Jennifer L. 
Pomeranz, A Comprehensive Strategy to Overhaul FDA Authority for Misleading 
Food Labels, 39 AM. J. L. & MED. 617, 639 (2013). 
88 See Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 14, 18; Christine Donovan, Note, If FDA 
Does Not Regulate Food, Who Will? A Study of Hormones and Antibiotics in Meat 
Production, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 459, 467 (2015) (describing the fragmented authority 
between the FDA and USDA); Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing 
Federal Food Safety Regulations, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 127–128 (2000) (noting 
that there is no single voice advocating for food safety, causing lack of accountability, 
ineffective allocation of resources, and lack of consistent policy); Amalea 
Smirniotopoulos, Bad Medicine: Prescription Drugs, Preemption, and the Potential 
for a No-Fault Fix, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 793, 808–10 (2012) (FDA is 
subject to manufacturer influence); Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 942–46 (DSHEA was 
strongly influenced by the supplement industry). 
89 Heinzerling, supra note 34, at 18; ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 212. 
90 Dan Flynn, GAO Report Calls for Single Food Safety Agency, FOOD SAFETY 
NEWS (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/03/call-for-one-food-
safety-agency-leads-historic-gao-report/#.V9ngaPkrLIU. 
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Authors have noted that FDA regulations can be 
contradictory, misleading, or ambiguous.91  For instance, in 
determining whether chain restaurants fall under the nutritional 
information burdens of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), the FDA 
defined the term “[l]ocation” as a “fixed position or site,” which 
eliminated all mobile establishments from the ACA menu 
requirements.92  Another example is the phrase “all natural,” 
which suggests that no harmful ingredients are present in the 
product, although that is not always the case.93  About two-thirds 
of consumers believe that “natural” means that there are no 
artificial ingredients in the product.94  Yet the FDA has not 
defined the term.95  The FDA cannot enforce its food laws when 
there is regulatory ambiguity.96 
Voluntary industry programs, often called “third party 
verification,” provide standards that compete with FDA 
regulations.  For instance, the “Facts Up Front” labeling 
program, created by the Grocery Manufacturers Association and 
the Food Marketing Institute, includes a set of voluntary front-of-
package labeling guidelines.97  Its voluntary nature suggests that 
manufacturers of unhealthy products will not choose to use the 
system at all.98  Having the industry, whose goal is to maximize 
 
91 Paben, supra note 74, at 185–86 (FDA has not defined “natural,” leading to 
confused consumers; FDA policies are designed to “assure ambiguity”); Stephanie 
Russ, Does This Law Make My Butt Look Big? Part II: No, But Food Does: An 
Overview of the FDA’s Menu Labeling Requirements, 35 FRANCHISE L.J. 61, 61–64 
(2015). In describing the new food regulations pertaining to the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”) (79 Fed. Reg. 71157), Russ describes what can only be viewed as a complex 
set of regulations that both expand and limit establishments that are required to 
abide by labeling provisions of the ACA. Restaurants are now covered, but not 
unless they are part of a chain of twenty or more restaurants. Id. Schools are not 
covered. Id. Mobile food services, such as food trucks, trains or airplanes, are exempt 
from regulation. Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in 
Restaurants and Similar Retail Food Establishments, 79 Fed. Reg. 71156, 71159 
(Dec. 1, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 11, 101) [hereinafter Food Labeling 
2014]. 
92 Food Labeling 2014, supra note 91, at 71254. 
93 Dickens, supra note 9, at 584. 
94 Paben, supra note 74, at 185 (citing CONSUMER REP. NAT’L RES. CTR., FOOD 
LABELS SURVEY (2014)). 
95 Id.; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., “Natural” on Food Labeling, 
https://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInfor
mation/LabelingNutrition/ucm456090.htm (last updated Nov. 11, 2017). 
96 See Paben, supra note 74, at 186; Pomeranz, supra note 87, at 628. 
97 Grocery Manufacturers Ass’n, Facts-Up-Front Front of Package Labeling 
Initiative, GMA, http://www.gmaonline.org/issues-policy/health-nutrition/facts-up-
front-front-of-pack-labeling-initiative/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
98 Currey, supra note 16, at 1302–04. 
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profits, craft such a program will likely lead to lax standards.99  
Similarly, industry-initiated eco-labels, which are not regulated 
by the FDA, convey messages, logos, stamps, or seals, tout only 
the positive and ignore the negative.100  The FDA should be able 
to ban any competing labeling standards. 
B. Problems With U.S. Food Laws 
There are concerns with the Dietary Supplement Health and 
Education Act of 1994 (“DSHEA”) and with other food labeling 
laws. 
In enacting DSHEA, Congress noted that one of the most 
important functions of the federal government is improving the 
health of its citizens, and that nutritional supplementation plays 
an important role in achieving that function.101  Congress noted 
that about 50% of Americans utilized dietary supplements.102  
Although the FDA had proposed stricter supplement regulations 
such as requiring pre-approval of supplements that make drug 
claims,103 DSHEA was met with strong pushback from the 
supplement industry.104  As mentioned earlier, this influence led 
Congress to include the following changes when enacting the 
 
99 Id. at 1303 (citing Center of Science in the Public Interest Executive Director 
Michael Jacobsen, who states that manufactures are free to only highlight the 
healthy components of the food, and not the unhealthy components, under the Facts 
Up Front Program) (citations omitted). 
100 Paben, supra note 74, at 187–88 (stating that in the U.S., manufactures use 
environmental claims on eco-labels as they see fit since they are not regulated, and 
that such labels “provide little value to the consumer and are often mere 
‘greenwashing.’ ”). 
101 Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-417,108 
Stat. 4325, 4325 (1994). 
102 Id. at 4326. 
103 Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. 33690, 33697 (June 18, 
1993). 
104 Arnold I. Friede, Dietary Supplements: Background for Dialogue Between the 
Industry and the Medical Profession, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 413, 419 (1998) (“The 
dietary supplement industry fought long and hard . . . for the relief provided by 
DSHEA from what was perceived to be arbitrary, onerous, and unnecessary 
regulation.”); Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 942–46 (“The FDA’s proposal was followed 
by industry pushback . . . .”); Jennifer Kay Braman, Note, Food for Sport or Faustian 
Bargain: Regulating Performance Enhancing Dietary Supplements, 47 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 417, 426–427 (1999) (noting “the enormous influence of the dietary supplement 
business.”); see also 139 CONG. REC. S4577-4578 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1993) (Statement 
of Sen. Hatch). Hatch decidedly criticized the FDA for being anti-consumer over the 
prior thirty years, including how it handled DSHEA (S. 784), suggesting industry 
hostility toward the FDA and noting industry support for DSHEA. Hatch was, 
however, careful not to attribute his condemnation to the industry. Rather, his 
argument was framed from the standpoint of a loss of consumer choice. 
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DSHEA: (1) the burden to prove adulteration or false or 
misleading information shifted to the FDA,105 (2) the law only 
applied to new supplement ingredients,106 (3) the DSHEA 
established an “imminent hazard” standard of proof in order to 
remove a product from sale,107 and (4) it allowed manufacturers 
to use unsubstantiated product label claims as long as a 
disclaimer was included stating the FDA had not evaluated the 
claim.108  The manufacturer-friendly nature of the DSHEA 
encouraged the introduction of many more supplement products 
into the market at the time of the passage of the DSHEA.  
Congress noted that in 1994 there were about 4,000 dietary 
supplements in the marketplace, with total annual sales of about 
$4 billion.109  By 2012, the estimate was 55,000 supplements in 
the marketplace.110  Today, it is estimated that the U.S. 
supplement industry rakes in $37 billion annually.111  For the 
reasons stated above, experts believe that the DSHEA is lax, 
which attracts manufacturers who are intent on maximizing 
profits with little regulatory oversight.112  Lobbyists have 
incentive to put millions of dollars into keeping DSHEA the 
same.113 
Consumers are confused by food labels and label claims.114  
For instance, having food labels on the back of products is less 
effective than the front.115  Authors note that “hidden trade-off 
 
105 § 4, 109 Stat. at 4328–29. 
106 § 8, 109 Stat. at 4331–32; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 946. 
107 § 4, 109 Stat. at 4328; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 946. 
108 § 6, 109 Stat. at 4329; see Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 948. 
109 § 3, 109 Stat, at 4326; Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 947. 
110 Bilbrough, supra note 9, at 947. 
111 John Bradley, NBJ: The US Supplement Industry is $37 billion, not $12 
Billion, NUTRITION BUSINESS JOURNAL (June 1, 2015), http://www.nutraingredients-
usa.com/Markets/NBJ-The-US-supplement-industry-is-37-billion-not-12-billion; see 
also Baird, Retail Sales of Vitamins & Nutritional Supplements in the United States 
from 2000 to 2017 (in Billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/ 
statistics/235801/retail-sales-of-vitamins-and-nutritional-supplements-in-the-us/ 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
112 Dickens, supra note 9, at 583–84, 587. 
113 Melanie Zanona, How the Dietary Supplement Industry Masters the Hill, CQ 
WEEKLY (June 1, 2015), http://melaniezanona.com/dietarysupplements/. 
114 Paben, supra note 74, at 175. 
115 Marianne Smith Edge et al., The Impact of Variations in a Fact-Based Front-
of-Package Nutrition Labeling System on Consumer Comprehension, 114 J. ACAD. 
NUTRITION & DIETETICS 843, 851 (2014) (although front-of-package labeling 
generally leads to increased accuracy in identifying product nutrition levels and 
lessens the necessity of perusing the nutrition facts label, such labeling is 
particularly helpful to those with lower education levels); Dhyani, supra note 11, at 
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claims” on the front of an item can mislead consumers into 
thinking products are healthier than they are.116  These claims 
highlight healthy ingredients but fail to mention ingredients 
located on the back label that may be unhealthy or less 
healthy.117  Manufacturers are tempted to highlight a beneficial 
component of a product and ignore the negative.118 
C. More Limits to FDA Power: Recent Case Law Decisions 
The recent court-imposed limits on food label claims have 
developed substantially over a forty-year period.  In 1976, the 
United States Supreme Court held in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council that an 
advertiser’s purely economic motive is afforded First Amendment 
protection because the free flow of commercial information may 
be useful to the consumer.119  That holding eventually affected 
food product claims.  The 1980 Supreme Court case Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commission of New York 
introduced an intermediate level of scrutiny to examine whether 
the speech had First Amendment protections, which consisted of 
four parts: (1) whether the speech is lawful and not misleading, if 
so (2) “whether the asserted government interest is substantial,” 
(3) “whether the regulation directly advances the governmental 
interest asserted,” and (4) “whether it is not more extensive than 
is necessary to serve that interest.”120 
Subsequently, in In re R.M.J., the Supreme Court held that 
although inherently misleading commercial speech may be 
prohibited in its entirety, potentially misleading speech may not  
 
 
 
 
30 (suggesting that the most important information should go on the front of the 
label); European Society of Cardiology, Members of European Parliament Discuss 
Food Labeling and Hearth Health (June 5, 2008), http://esciencenews.com/articles/ 
2008/06/05/members.european.parliament.discuss.food.labeling.and.heart.health 
(“Front of pack labelling should allow consumers to know at a glance whether a 
product contributes to their health or not."). 
116 Dhyani, supra note 11, at 37–38. 
117 Id. 
118 Dickens, supra note 9, at 584. 
119 Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
762–65 (1976). 
120 Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). 
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be banned if it could be offered in a non-deceptive way.121  The In 
re R.M.J. Court suggested that a disclaimer would suffice instead 
of an outright ban.122 
Starting in 1999, and expanding on In re R.M.J., a string of 
decisions curtailed the FDA’s power to ban misleading speech.  
The trouble for the FDA started with Pearson v. Shalala 
(“Pearson I”), where the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia struck down the FDA decision to 
unilaterally ban potentially misleading health claims on 
nutritional supplements because the court felt doing so was a 
violation of the fourth part of the Central Hudson test—the 
“reasonable fit” requirement.123  The court held that an outright 
ban on potentially misleading health claims was unconstitutional 
and that instead the FDA could require that disclaimers be 
used.124  The Pearson I court gave the FDA guidance when it 
noted that a health claim can be banned by the FDA when 
supporting evidence for the claim is weaker than contrary 
evidence.125  The FDA revised its rules in light of the Pearson I 
decision, denied the claims of the manufacturer from Pearson I, 
and lost again when challenged in district court because of its 
refusal to issue disclaimers.126  In 2001, Pearson v. Thompson 
(“Pearson III”) suggested that a disclaimer would have been 
appropriate instead of a complete denial of the health claim.127  
The D.C. District Court confirmed this position in Whitaker v. 
Thompson.128 
The FDA finally took the direction of the courts by 
subsequently creating “qualified health claims”: a new category 
of health claims supported by credible evidence.129  The FDA will 
issue a disclaimer if it can remedy, or qualify, the health claim. If 
 
121 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). 
122 Id. at 201, 203. 
123 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (typically 
referred to as Pearson I, the first of three cases concerning the FDA and these 
plaintiffs). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 659 n.10 (“Similarly, we see no problem with the FDA imposing an 
outright ban on a claim where evidence in support of the claim 
is qualitatively weaker than evidence against the claim-for example, where the claim 
rests on only one or two old studies.”) (emphasis added).  
126 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson II), 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 114 (D.D.C. 2001). 
127 Pearson v. Thompson (Pearson III), 141 F. Supp. 2d 105, 110–11 (D.D.C. 
2001). 
128 Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2002). 
129 Evidence-Based Review System, supra note 43, at §§ II., III.A; ROBERTS, 
supra note 1, at 234. 
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a disclaimer cannot remedy the claim, it may be banned.130  This 
new category of health claims is distinct from unqualified health 
claims, which are supported by significant scientific agreement 
and thus need no disclaimer of qualification.131  The Whitaker 
court opined that rejecting a claim without offering any 
disclaimer at all should only be allowed in instances “where there 
was little-to-no scientific evidence in support of the claim and 
where the government could prove that the public would still be 
deceived by the claim even with the use of accompanying 
disclaimers.”132  However, Pearson I, the controlling Court of 
Appeals case, noted that the evidentiary standard to ban a claim 
is simply when supporting evidence is “outweighed” by non-
supporting evidence.133  The Pearson I court also noted that the 
FDA could ban a health claim if supporting evidence is 
“qualitatively weaker” than negative evidence,134 which appears 
to be more in line with Central Hudson’s “more likely to deceive” 
standard.135 
Not only is the FDA prohibited from completely banning 
potentially misleading health claims without considering the 
issuance of a disclaimer, but three recent cases have also 
restricted its disclaimer language, holding that strongly worded 
verbiage effectively negates the claim and infringes on 
commercial speech rights.136 
Finally, the courts have started to exercise a stricter 
standard of review for FDA actions.  In a 2010 case, the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia applied an 
independent review standard when deciding constitutional issues 
brought against the FDA, rather than the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review that the Administrative Procedure 
Act calls for.137  Although the court chose to review the FDA’s 
decision under the independent review standard, it stated that it 
will give some deference to the FDA’s expertise in weighing the 
 
130 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). 
131 Questions and Answers on Health Claims in Food Labeling, supra note 38. 
132 Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 13. 
133 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
134 Id. at 659 n.10. 
135 Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
563 (1980). 
136 All. for Nat. Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 71 (D.D.C. 2010); 
All. for Nat. Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11–14 (D.D.C. 2011); 
Fleminger v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 854 F. Supp. 2d 192, 195 (D. 
Conn. 2012). 
137 All. for Nat. Health U.S., 714 F. Supp. 2d at 48, 59–60. 
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scientific evidence in denying claims.138  The independent review 
standard is nonetheless tougher than the arbitrary and 
capricious review standard.  Under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard, a court cannot subvert the expertise of an agency’s 
work.139  However, under the independent review standard, a 
court independently assesses the agency’s actions against the 
plaintiff’s constitutional claims.140 
III. ZEROING IN ON THE EFFECTIVENESS/EFFECT OF FOOD 
LABELS, HEALTH CLAIMS, DISCLAIMERS, AND COURT DECISIONS 
Food labeling is the main means of disseminating nutrition 
content information and health claims to consumers.  In addition 
to traditional package labeling, restaurants are beginning to 
provide nutritional information on their menus.  This gives 
consumers the nutritional information to make healthy dining 
choices if they desire.  The availability of nutritional information 
presented on a restaurant menu is similar to nutritional 
information presented on a food or nutritional supplement label, 
in that in both instances once consumers zero in on a specific 
item choice, item-specific nutritional information is visible.  It is 
therefore important to analyze the effectiveness of the current 
labeling scheme while also determining if providing nutritional 
information in restaurants is useful.  Considering that any set of 
laws will be compromised by non-compliance, it is also important 
to assess to what extent manufacturers are complying with the 
FDA’s confusing choice of label laws.  Finally, recent court 
decisions regarding commercial speech as it concerns label claims 
must be scrutinized as another means of assessing the 
effectiveness of the food law scheme. 
A. Recent U.S. Food Studies Regarding the Effectiveness of 
Providing Nutrition Information 
After summarizing the results of the following studies on the 
effectiveness of providing nutrition information, it is clear that 
the vast majority of consumers scrutinize nutrition information 
on product labels141—especially for an unfamiliar product142—and 
 
138 Id. at 60. 
139 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376–78 (1989). 
140 Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 780 (5th Cir. 1979). 
141 Brian Elbel et al., Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the 
Effects on Low-Income People in New York City, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS w1110 (2009), 
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that nutrition labels are most effective when placed on the front 
of the package.143  The presence of nutrition information effects 
health by affecting healthy choices.144  Although health-conscious 
consumers use nutrition information effectively,145 evidence 
shows that the absence of nutrition information causes most 
consumers to consistently underestimate the amount of calories 
they consume.146  Further, the findings suggest that consumers 
who may not necessarily consider themselves health-conscious 
would make more conscious health choices if nutrition 
information was provided.147 
Three studies from 2002 of 292 subjects indicated that 
providing nutritional information both on a product label and on 
a restaurant menu positively affected product attitude, nutrition 
attitude, and purchasing decisions.148  This work is important 
because it tested the effectiveness of nutrition information for a 
 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/6/w1110.full.pdf+html; Smith Edge et al., 
supra note 116, at 845; Marian Burros, Read Any Good Nutrition Labels Lately?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/01/dining/read-any-good-
nutrition-labels-lately.html?_r=0. 
142 Smith Edge et al., supra note 116, at 845. 
143 INT’L FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, FRONT OF PACK LABELING 
CONSUMER RESEARCH PROJECT 34 (2011), https://www.foodinsight.org/Content/3651/ 
IFIC%20FOP%20SLIDES%20for%20WEB2011.pdf; Smith Edge et al., supra note 
116, at 851. 
144 Scot Burton & Elizabeth H. Creyer, What Consumers Don’t Know Can Hurt 
Them: Consumer Evaluations and Disease Risk Perceptions of Restaurant Menu 
Items, 38 J. CONSUMER AFF. 121, 142 (2004) (inclusion of negative health 
information on labels changed decisions to not purchase products more than did 
labels that did not include any health information); Christina A. Roberto et al., 
Evaluating the Impact of Menu Labeling on Food Choices and Intake, 100 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 312, 314, 316 (2010). 
145 Lisa J. Harnack, et al., Effects of Calorie Labeling and Value Size Pricing on 
Fast Food Meal Choices: Results From an Experimental Trial, 5 INT’L J. BEHAV. 
NUTRITION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 63, 68–71 (2008); Chung-Tung Jordan Lin et al., 
Do Dietary Intakes Affect Search for Nutrient Information on Food Labels?, 59 SOC. 
SCI. & MED. 1955, 1962 (2004) (This study was actually a combination of studies 
conducted in 1994, 1996 and 2000); Szanyi, supra note 11, at 162. 
146 Roberto et al., supra note 144, at 316; Burton & Creyer, supra note 144, at 
142; Margo G. Wootan & Melissa Osborn, Availability of Nutrition Information from 
Chain Restaurants in the United States, 30 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 266, 268 
(2006) (noting that even nutrition experts consistently underestimate the number of 
calories in restaurant meals); Burton et al., Attacking the Obesity Epidemic: The 
Potential Health Benefits of Providing Nutrition Information in Restaurants, 96 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 1669 (2006).  
147 Roberto et al., supra note 144, at 316. 
148 John C. Kozup et al., Making Healthful Food Choices: The Influence of 
Health Claims and Nutrition Information on Consumers’ Evaluations of Packaged 
Food Products and Restaurant Menu Items, 67 J. MKTG. 19, 23 (2003). 
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packaged food item and a restaurant item, and because it also 
tested the effect of health claims, which will be discussed in the 
next section. 
A 2004 survey by Burton & Creyer analyzed responses from 
377 subjects after they saw a menu containing either no nutrition 
information, a healthy food menu with nutrition information, or 
an unhealthy food menu with nutrition information.149  Survey 
results indicated that subjects were not aware of the unhealthy 
nutrient level of foods, and suggested that the provision of 
nutrition information affected “attitudes, perceptions, and 
judgments.”150  Two 2006 studies also measured the differences 
between consumer perception of nutrition levels against actual 
nutritional content.151  In the first study, the 193 respondents 
who were given a “less-healthful” menu underestimated calorie 
content by almost 50%, fat content by 44 grams, and saturated 
fat content by 15 grams.152  Sodium levels were also greatly 
underestimated: by 847 mg for “more-healthful” foods, 1,557 mg 
for “less-healthful” foods and a whopping 4,353 mg for “extremely 
unhealthful” foods.153  In the second study, the 241 respondents 
were provided with nutrition information in restaurants.154  This 
study showed that calorie and nutrient information “influenced 
attitudes, intentions, and choices.”155  Specifically, respondents 
limited “less-healthful” choices when the nutritional information 
was available.156  The authors concluded that “[b]ecause our 
results showed that consumers substantially underestimated 
 
149 Burton & Creyer, supra note 144, at 127–29. Survey questions asked 
respondents to indicate their perception of the nutrition level of the items on the 
menu they reviewed, as well as asking about item attitude and purchase intentions. 
Id. at 143, app. 
150 Id. at 121, 131. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 1671 (noting that the fat and saturated fat underestimations alone 
amounted to “more than 60% of the recommended daily values.”). 
153 Id. The recommended daily sodium intake value is less than 2,400 mg., 
according to the FDA. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SODIUM IN YOUR DIET: USE THE 
NUTRITION LABEL AND REDUCE YOUR INTAKE 1, in FOOD FACTS (June 2018), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/food/ingredientspackaginglabeling/ucm315471.pdf. 
154 Burton et al., supra note 146, at 1672–73. 
155 Id. at 1674. 
156 Id. For a healthy choice: when a chef’s salad was presented with just calorie 
information, there was no decrease in purchase from when no information was 
present. Id. But when other nutrition information was provided, there was a 
significant decrease in the purchase of the chef’s salad, which makes sense because a 
chef’s salad contains a moderate level of calories but a significantly high level of fats 
and saturated fats. Id. 
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calorie levels for less-healthful . . . items and that preference for 
the less-healthful items diminished when nutrition information 
was disclosed, provision of nutrition information . . . would 
appear helpful.”157 
In a telephone survey of 554 people in 2004, 85% of 
respondents reported that they read nutrition labels and 66% of 
them indicated that it was a factor in their purchasing 
decisions.158  Another 2004 telephone survey of 649 community 
members found that over 66% often viewed food labels and 18.9% 
occasionally did.159 
A 2005-2006 study of nearly 600 respondents who regularly 
frequented fast-food establishments found that nearly 60% of 
respondents chose “nutrition” as a very important purchasing 
factor and 83.5% felt it was at least a somewhat important 
factor.160  There was an approximately 150-calorie difference in 
consumption for respondents who reported that nutritional 
information was important to their purchasing decisions 
compared to those who did not, and an approximately 300-calorie 
difference when price was also important.161  In this study, the 
majority of respondents placed a high value on nutritional 
information, and chose fewer calories when given appropriate 
nutritional information compared to those who did not place as 
high a value on nutritional information.  This result suggests 
that providing granular nutritional information would be quite 
useful to the large number of consumers who place a high value 
on nutritional information, which is also the suggestion of other 
studies from 1997-2010.162 
 
157 Id. 
158 Burros, supra note 141. 
159 Rebecca A. Krukowski et al., Consumers May Not Use or Understand Calorie 
Labeling in Restaurants, 106 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 917, 918 (2006). 
160 Harnack, et al., supra note 145, at 63, 68. Respondents received one of four 
menus—with varying nutritional information—in which to order their food from, 
and results were tabulated from this one-time order. Id. at 64–65. 
161 Id. at 69, 71 tbl. 8 (stating that the average caloric intake was “significantly 
lower” for participants who identified that nutrition was important and who received 
calorie plus price information). 
162 See also Lin et al., supra note 145, at 1962; Szanyi, supra note 11, at 162 
n.27 (citing Matthew W. Kreuter et al., Do Nutrition Label Readers Eat Healthier 
Diets? Behavioral Correlates of Adults’ Use of Food Labels?, 13 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE 
MED. 277 (1997)); CHRISTIAN A. GREGORY ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, 
CONSUMERS’ USE OF NUTRITION INFORMATION WHEN EATING OUT 31, 33 (2014). 
(Consumers with healthy dietary habits are more likely to utilize health information 
if provided in restaurants: People who have utilized health information at 
restaurants, or indicate they’d do so if available, are likely to do so in the future; It is 
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A 2008 study of 1,156 low-income residents took a first look 
at the New York City (“NYC”) restaurant labeling requirement.163  
Fast-food restaurant purchases by low-income participants were 
compared to purchases by low-income members in Newark, New 
Jersey, which does not have a restaurant labeling requirement, 
before and after the NYC labeling requirement took effect.164  
Fifty-four percent more NYC respondents noticed caloric 
information after the labeling mandate, while at the same time 
the percentage did not rise in Newark.165  After the labeling 
mandate, nearly 28% of NYC responents indicated that caloric 
information influenced their purcasing decisions, and 88% 
indicated that they purchased fewer calories because of the 
labeling.166  However, there was no significant decrease in the 
number of calories consumed167 although information as to the 
value that participants placed on nutritional information was not 
ascertained.168  Although the mandatory restaurant labeling law 
did not, at the time of this study, result in an overall significant 
reduction in calories being consumed, it is not known if the 
nutritional information positively affected the choices of health-
conscious respondents.  It is also not known if there were other 
variables that could have affected the respondents’ purchasing 
choices.  Perhaps the restaurant choices of low-income consumers 
are largely limited to fast-food establishments, which typically 
sell highly caloric food at low cost.  Another possibility is that 
consumers will make their food selections by comparing items on 
a menu and they “will view high-calorie choices as more 
reasonable and healthy when they are presented among other 
high-calorie options.”169  Or these results may simply indicate 
that low-income consumers lack an understanding of their daily 
caloric needs.170 
 
 
suggested that health-conscious consumers actively look for health information but 
others do not). 
163 Elbel et al., supra note 141, at w1110. 
164 Id. at w1110–11.  
165 Id. at w1114–15; see id. at w1115 tbl. 1 (presenting a statistical graphic 
comparison of those in New York City and Newark who noticed caloric information 
and how it affected their purchases). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at w1116–17. 
168 Compare id. at w1113–14, with Harnack et al., supra note 145. 
169 Szanyi, supra note 11, at 177. 
170 Krukowski et al., supra note 159, at 918. 
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When given the choice of a cheaper and healthier option, 
low-income consumers in general may exercise more health-
conscious choices.  For instance, about one third of respondents 
who noticed the nutritional information posted in Subway stores 
ate fewer calories as compared to patrons who did not notice the 
posted information.171 
In 2007 and 2008, Subway, a fast food chain known for 
healthy options, was studied; 303 respondents were shown one of 
three menus to order a meal: a menu with no nutrition 
information, one with nutrition information, and one with 
nutrition information and a statement that the recommended 
daily caloric intake is 2,000 calories.172  The three menu groups 
were compared to determine the difference between estimated 
calorie intake and actual intake.173  Subjects whose menus had no 
nutrition information ordered on average approximately 330 
more calories and consumed 177 more calories than subjects that 
had nutrition information.174  The respondents whose menus did 
not have nutrition information were not as accurate as were the 
other groups in estimating caloric intake: nearly 75% of this 
group underestimated calorie consumption and 25.6% 
overestimated consumption, whereas the underestimated and 
overestimated totals for the two groups whose menus had 
nutrition information were nearly even, at about 50%.175  This 
confirmed results from previous studies.176 
Finally, in 2010, the International Food Information Council 
Federation administered a food label survey to 7,363 respondents 
designed to critique a proposed food label scheme change.177  The 
survey found that 86% of respondents viewed food labels 
“regularly or occasionally” before purchasing a product for the 
first time, 85% “regularly or occasionally” read labels to compare 
 
171 Mary T. Bassett et al., Purchasing Behavior and Calorie Information at Fast-
Food Chains in New York City, 2007, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1457, 1458 (2008). 
These respondents were part of a large study of 7,318 respondents who frequented 
several fast food establishments that provided nutrition information. Id. at 1457. 
172 Roberto et al., supra note 144, at 312–13. After the meal, a questionnaire was 
administered which was followed up with a recall interview the next evening. Id. at 
313. 
173 Id. at 316. 
174 Id. at 315. 
175 Id. 
176 Kozup et al., surpa note 148, at 26. 
177 INT’L FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, supra note 143, at 8; Smith 
Edge, supra note 116, at 844 (describing the study and also providing the data in 
table form). 
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nutritional values,178 and significantly more nutritional 
information was comprehended when included on the front of 
package label.179 
B. Studies Regarding the Effectiveness of Health, 
Structure/Function Claims, or Disclaimers 
The dissemination of nutritional information about a food 
product is not limited to the factual display of nutrients on a 
label.  It extends to claims that are allowed to be included on the 
label.  Therefore, it is important that we analyze studies on the 
effectiveness of such claims.  A summary of the results of the 
following studies on the effectiveness of health and 
structure/function claims suggest that (1) favorable health 
information is best left on the nutrition facts panel,180 (2) the 
shorter the health claim the better,181 (3) consumers are confused 
by the current scheme of front-of-package labeling practices,182 
and (4) manufacturers are largely not compliant with FDA rules 
regarding structure/function claims,183 leading to more consumer 
confusion because of unreliable product information on the label.  
In addition, manufacturers do not always use the required FDA 
label disclaimers for qualified health claims.184 
Kozup et al. tested nearly 300 subjects on the effectiveness of 
health claims and nutrition information on packaged products 
and restaurant menu items.185  Respondents in both groups were 
shown a product with no nutrition information, positive nutrition 
information, or negative information, along with either a positive 
 
178 INT’L FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, supra note 143, at 123–24; 
Smith Edge, supra note 116, at 845. 
179 INT’L FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, supra note 143, at 34; 
Smith Edge, supra note 116, at 851. 
180 Kozup et al., supra note 148, at 25 tbl 2. 
181 Brian Wansink et al., Front-Panel Health Claims: When Less is More 10 
(Sept. 1, 2004), http://foodpsychology.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/unmanaged_files/ 
Front-Label Health Claims Article.pdf. 
182 Brenda M. Derby & Alan S. Levy, Effects of Strength of Science Disclaimers 
on the Communication Impacts of Health Claims (Nov. 2005); Paben, supra note 74, 
at 175. 
183 DANIEL LEVINSON, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS FAIL 
TO MEET FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 1, 9–12, 16 (2012). 
184 Paula Fitzgerald Bone & Karen Russo France, Qualified Health Claims on 
Package Labels, 28 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 253, 257 (2009). 
185 Kozup et al., supra note 148, at 22–23. 
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health claim or no health claim.186  Thus, comparisons could be 
made between claims that matched or did not match nutrition 
information on the nutrition facts panel or menu, as well as to 
the effect of claims when the menu contained no nutrition 
information.  Respondents who viewed the package label 
containing favorable nutrition information and the heart health 
claim recorded a positive effect on nutrition attitude, product 
attitude, and purchase intention as compared to respondents who 
viewed favorable nutrition information without a health claim.187  
However, the positive health claim, combined with negative 
nutrition information had a negative effect on product attitude, 
purchase intention, and perceived credibility, suggesting that 
consumers viewed health claims with skepticism and relied on 
the nutrition facts panel as the more accurate means of judging 
the healthfulness of a food.188  Results were similar for the 
respondents who viewed the restaurant menu item.189  Kozup et 
al. asserted that favorable nutrition information on the nutrition 
facts panel is a better indicator of product purchase and product 
attitude than favorable health claims.190  Perhaps, the more 
accurate statement is that such is the case until food label laws 
are streamlined. 
Wansink et al. studied whether the length of health claims 
affected respondents.191  In the study, 118 participants were 
given the same product to view, but with either a short health 
claim or a longer claim on the label.192  Results indicated that 
consumers who saw the shorter claim understood the product 
better and retained specific facts compared to those who saw the 
longer claim.193 
 
186 Id. at 21–22, 25; see id. at 25 (Table 2 provides breakdown of mean scores by 
each of these factors). 
187 Id. at 25 tbl. 2. 
188 Id. at 25. 
189 Id. at 25 tbl. 2. For respondents who reviewed the restaurant menu item, the 
heart health claim also had a positive effect on nutrition attitude and intent to 
purchase in both the no-nutrition information and positive nutrition information 
groups, as well as having a positive effect on product attitude in the no-nutrition 
information group. Id. As with results from respondents who viewed the product 
label, the positive health claim had a negative effect on product attitude, purchase, 
and perceived credibility when combined with negative nutrition information on the 
menu. Id. 
190 Id. at 25. 
191 Wansink et al., supra note 181, at 3. 
192 Id. at 7–8. 
193 Id. at 10. 
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Derby and Levy tested over 1,900 respondents on the effects 
of disclaimers designed to convey the strength of scientific 
evidence of health claims.194  They found that disclaimers did not 
satisfactorily convey such evidence except to respondents with 
strong health consciousness and respondents between ages 30-
45.195  Derby and Levy noted that text disclaimers were not 
reliable at conveying the strength of scientific evidence and that 
symbol disclaimers—report card grades instead of text—used in 
conjunction with the health claim often caused respondents to 
attribute a higher degree of healthfulness to a lower grade than 
to a superior healthy product without a grade.196  They noted that 
respondents viewed the information as some sort of marketing 
endeavor, thus they reverted to their initial assessment of the 
products instead of relying on the letter grades.197  At the least, 
these findings point to consumer uncertainty because of having 
different labeling mechanisms provided by different parties. 
A 2006 study of nearly 1,300 product labels found few 
products that were able to use qualified health claims actually 
used them.198  Instead, they often used “structure–function 
claims” or “nutrition content claims.”199  “Structure/function 
claims” describe the role an ingredient plays in the “normal 
structure or function of the human body.”200  Nutrition content 
claims state the nutritional makeup of the product, and are 
allowed as long as the FDA has defined the ingredient.201  Less 
than 8% of the labels that were able to use unqualified health 
claims—those not requiring an FDA disclaimer—did so.202  There 
was a large difference between the percentages of the types of 
claims used on foods versus supplements: structure/function 
claims were the most prevalent claim on supplements (42.6%), 
whereas nutrition content claims were most prevalent on foods 
(26.8%).203  The authors of the study noted that plausible reasons 
for manufacturers not using qualified health claims are because 
 
194 Derby & Levy, supra note 182, at 1–3, 17–18. 
195 Id. at 3, 32–34. 
196 Id. at 34. 
197 Id. at 37. 
198 Bone & France, supra note 184, at 253–55, 257. 
199 Id. at 253–54, 257. 
200 Structure/Function Claims, supra note 36. 
201 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-535, § 3, 104 Stat. 
2353, 2357 (1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 343).  
202 Bone & France, supra note 184, at 257. 
203 Id. 
2018] SOLVING THE CRAZY MAZE OF FOOD LAWS 261 
nutrition content claims have few legal restrictions and because 
the use of structure-function claims are not subject to the high 
evidentiary standard associated with health claims, and they do 
not require pre-market approval.204 
The studies discussed above focused on consumers’ belief and 
reliance on health claims and nutritional labels.  Another means 
of determining the effectiveness of food label laws is to study 
manufacturer compliance with FDA requirements.  If there is 
substantial non-compliance with the FDA’s laws, it could lead to 
consumer uncertainty or even false reliance on erroneous 
information on food labels.  Based on substantial concerns for the 
accuracy of dietary supplement labels, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) recently analyzed 
structure/function claims on 119 dietary supplements 
manufactured by U.S. companies.205  Structure/function claims 
address a documented nutrient deficiency disease (e.g., high 
blood pressure, Rickets, Scurvy) and describe the positive role the 
product’s nutrient or ingredient plays in addressing such a 
deficiency, or how the ingredient or nutrient positively affects the 
general well-being of the human body.206  A structure/function 
claim cannot state that it “treat[s], cures, or prevents any 
disease.”207  For example, “calcium builds strong bones” is an 
allowable structure/function claim.208  However, the statement 
“calcium prevents osteoporosis” is not allowed because it claims 
to prevent a specific disease.  Since structure/function claims do 
not require pre-approval, the FDA requires three things from 
manufacturers: (1) substantiation documentation must be 
generated; (2) the FDA must be notified within thirty days of 
marketing the product; and (3) a disclaimer must be used stating 
that the FDA has not evaluated the statement.209  Although the 
FDA cannot require documents be sent to them, the 
manufacturer must create substantiation documents for 
structure/function claims before the product is placed in the 
market.210  In its study of structure/function claims of the 119 
dietary supplements, HHS requested substantiation documents 
 
204 Id. 
205 LEVINSON, supra note 183 at 1, 8–9. 
206 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(A) (2012); Structure/Function Claims, supra note 36, at 
1. 
207 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C). 
208 Id.; Structure/Function Claims, supra note 36. 
209 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C); Structure/Function Claims, supra note 36. 
210 LEVINSON, supra note 183, at 4-5. 
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and received them for seventy-two of the supplements.211  
Contrary to the FDA requirement, only about one-third of the 
substantiation documents were based on human studies.212  HHS 
determined that none of the human studies satisfied all 
recommendations of the FDA, and in fact only 2% of the human 
studies pertained to the product in question.213  Finally, over 20% 
of supplements contained prohibited disease treatment claims 
and 7% did not contain the required disclaimer that the 
statement has not been reviewed by the FDA.214  HHS 
determined that the current system raises concerns of 
unreliability since all three of the FDA requirements for products 
making structure/function claims were largely unmet, and since 
20% of supplements contained illegal disease prevention 
claims.215 
A large 2006 study found that 147 supplement labels using 
structured/function claims did not use the mandatory disclaimer 
indicating the FDA has not evaluated the product, and that 
twenty labels made qualified health claims without the 
mandatory FDA disclaimer.216 
C. Commercial Speech and Health Claims 
No evaluation of the effectiveness of food label laws is 
complete without an analysis of how courts have applied the 
four-part commercial speech test to food label claims.  By looking 
at how courts apply the test in different scenarios, 
inconsistencies and errors in applying the law may be uncovered. 
As previously noted, the Supreme Court in Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York set 
forth the four-part test for determining if a government 
restriction on commercial speech is valid: (1) whether the speech 
is lawful and not misleading, if so (2) “whether the asserted 
government interest is substantial,” (3) “whether the regulation  
 
 
211 Id. at 9. 
212 Id. at 11. 
213 Id. at 12. 
214 Id. at 16. 
215 Id. at 15–18. To be fair, HHS noted that the FDA’s notification letter 
electronic storage system could not be searched by keyword. Therefore, although 
seventeen of the twenty-one letters the FDA was able to find were incomplete, it is 
not known with certainty if the remaining manufacturers did not submit a letter or 
if HHS simply could not retrieve them from the FDA storage system. 
216 Bone & France, supra note 184, at 257. 
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directly advances the governmental interest asserted,” and 
(4) “whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve 
that interest.”217 
The government may satisfy the first prong of Central 
Hudson if it can prove that the language in question is either 
potentially or inherently misleading.218  Inherently misleading 
speech can be fully banned.219  If speech is potentially misleading, 
the FDA must consider whether the claim can be remedied with 
a disclaimer.220  The FDA can ban potentially misleading speech 
if it provides substantial evidence that the speech is actually 
misleading and if a disclaimer cannot cure the misleading 
speech.221  If the message targets a sophisticated audience, such 
as the promotion of CPA services that are directed at experienced 
business executives, the claim has been found not to be 
deceptive.222  However, if the message in question targets the 
general public or a vulnerable population, courts are more likely 
to hold that the speech is misleading.223  For instance, in 
American Academy of Pain Management v. Joseph, the Ninth 
Circuit held that when a group of doctors used the phrase “board 
certified” in advertisements even though they did not qualify as 
board certified according the statutory definition, it was 
inherently misleading to the general public and to other specific 
groups.224  Along the same line, in Association of National  
 
 
 
217 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
218 Gerald Masoudi & Christopher Pruitt, The Food & Drug Administration v. 
the First Amendment: A Survey of Recent FDA Enforcement, 21 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. 
& MED. 111, 121–122 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). 
219 Id. at 121 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). 
220 Id. at 121–22 (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 
(2002); and Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 
(1994)). 
221 Id. (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12–17 (1979); Thompson v. W. 
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002); and Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l 
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994)). 
222 Krista Hessler Carver, A Global View of the First Amendment Constraints on 
FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 172 (2008) (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 
775–76 (1993)). 
223 Id. (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 449, 465 (1985) for 
the court’s blanket ban on in-person attorney solicitation “of vulnerable accident 
victims”). 
224 American Acad. of Pain Mgmt. v. Joseph, 353 F.3d 1099, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
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Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, the Ninth Circuit held that speech 
defining certain environmental terms differently than was 
required by law was potentially misleading to the public.225 
Central Hudson states that a communication may be banned 
if it is “more likely to deceive the public than to inform it.”226  
Since Central Hudson, a standard for weighing the evidence 
associated with health claims has developed: if a claim is 
supported by significant scientific agreement then no disclaimer 
is needed; if a claim is supported by credible evidence then it may 
be used subject to an FDA disclaimer unless a disclaimer cannot 
make the claim whole, in which case the FDA may ban the claim; 
and if the claim is not supported by even credible evidence, then 
the claim may be banned.227  This evidence-based standard can be 
characterized as being less subjective and more fact-driven than 
the “more likely to deceive” standard, better serving the need to 
ensure reliable claims on the front label.228 
In In re R.M.J., the Supreme Court held that potentially 
misleading speech cannot be banned if it could be offered in a 
non-deceptive way.229  The Court relied on Bates vs. State Bar of 
Arizona, which generally suggested the preference for the use of 
a disclaimer or an explanation over an outright ban for 
misleading speech.230  The use of a disclaimer, however, was not a 
requirement in Bates, which concerned truthful speech, not 
misleading speech.231  In fact, it was an extraneous comment 
about facts not at issue in the case.  The Court in Bates noted 
that the benefits derived from commercial speech required its 
“accuracy and reliability” and then simply mentioned the use of a 
disclaimer as one possible course of action for misleading speech, 
as opposed to an outright ban, if the situation called for it.232  
 
225 Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 1994). 
226 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980). 
227 JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHERINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION § 10:66 (4th ed. 2017); Evidence-Based Review System, supra note 
43. 
228 Evidence-Based Review System, supra note 43. 
229 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (citing Bates v. State Bar of Az., 433 
U.S. 350, 375 (1977)). 
230 Id. 
231 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). 
232 Id. at 383–384. As relating to misleading speech, the Bates court in dicta 
stated: 
Indeed, the public and private benefits from commercial speech derive from 
confidence in its accuracy and reliability. Thus, the leeway for untruthful or 
misleading expression that has been allowed in other contexts has little 
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Therefore, In re R.M.J. misapplied Bates by relying on its dicta, 
and further by incorrectly interpreting a requirement for a 
disclaimer. 
An important recent line of cases, which required the FDA to 
issue disclaimers instead of banning the health claims, are of 
limited scope and have misapplied the law.  First, these decisions 
should be considered to be of limited scope because one is from 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the 
other three are from federal district court, which by definition 
are of limited applicability geographically and as precedential 
value.233  In fact, all four of these cases are from within the D.C. 
Circuit.  Second, these cases misapplied the law because the 
health claims in question were not supported by significant 
scientific evidence, the sole standard when Pearson I was 
decided, or enough credible evidence to require a disclaimer. 
The FDA initially had full support in the District of 
Columbia jurisdiction.  In siding with the FDA’s banning of the 
nutritional supplement health claims in question, the Pearson I 
trial court followed precedent at every turn when it held: (1) the 
FDA’s conclusions were accorded a highly deferential standard of 
review; (2) that the FDA’s adoption of the significant scientific 
agreement standard was valid; and (3) that the four health 
claims in question were properly banned for not having met that 
standard.234  The trial court cited to the Supreme Court’s 
precedent for its determination that the FDA is afforded a highly 
deferential standard of review—“[t]he Court may not substitute 
 
force in the commercial arena. In fact, because the public lacks 
sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might be 
overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite 
inappropriate in legal advertising. For example, advertising claims as to 
the quality of services a matter we do not address today are not susceptible 
of measurement or verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to 
be misleading as to warrant restriction. Similar objections might justify 
restraints on in-person solicitation. We do not foreclose the possibility that 
some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like, 
might be required of even an advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so 
as to assure that the consumer is not misled. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
233 The holdings of all of these cases apply to a small geographical area: the D.C. 
Circuit and not to other circuits. Further, district court opinions are not binding as 
precedent. They are only binding as to the litigants of the case: The FDA, Pearson, 
and the rest of the litigants in the three district court cases. 
234 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I (trial court)), 14 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15–19 (D.D.C. 
1998). 
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its judgment for that of the agency.”235  The trial court cited to 
another Supreme Court case for authority that this high level of 
agency deference is especially important when there is a 
challenge to “an evaluation of complex scientific data within the 
agency’s technical expertise.”236  The trial court then cited its 
very own circuit court for its holding that stated the judicial 
branch is not “to undertake comparative evaluations of 
conflicting scientific evidence.”237  The trial court cited to In re 
R.M.J. for its statement that a health claim is inherently 
misleading if consumers do not have the knowledge to evaluate 
it,238 and also cited to the scientific evidence and comments the 
FDA evaluated when holding that the claims were rightfully 
banned for lack of evidentiary support.239 
The D.C. Circuit in Pearson I unilaterally disagreed with the 
trial court, reversing its decision and banning the FDA 
disclaimers.240  It relied on In re R.M.J. for its statement that a 
ban on a potentially misleading claim is illegal “if the 
information also may be presented in a way that is not 
deceptive.”241  In other words, the court implied that a claim must 
be allowed if a disclaimer can be crafted by the FDA that adds 
information to make the claim complete.  In re R.M.J. relied on 
dicta from Bates v. State Bar of Arizona as authority for this 
requirement.242  Even if the statements were merely potentially 
misleading, the use of a disclaimer was only one suggestion by 
the In re R.M.J. Court.243  The use of a disclaimer was not a 
requirement by law.  It is alarming that a disclaimer would be 
required with no direct evidence to support the claim, and 
therein is a fundamental problem with the court’s holding in 
Pearson I. 
Aside from the insistence that a disclaimer could remedy the 
banned claims at hand, the Pearson I court clearly went further 
than a reasonable reading of In re R.M.J. when suggesting that a 
 
235 Id. at 15. 
236 Id. (citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 
87, 103 (1983)). 
237 Id. (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 824 F.2d 1211, 1216 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987)). 
238 Id. at 18 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982)). 
239 Id. at 18–19. 
240 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
241 Id. at 655 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203). 
242 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. 
243 Id. 
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disclaimer could rectify the ills of the first three claim denials—
claims that had no supporting human studies on nutrition 
supplements had ever been undertaken.244  The claims were 
simply not proven by the significant scientific agreement 
standard (there was no lesser credible evidence standard at this 
time) and should have been allowed to be banned.  This holding 
leaves one to wonder if there would ever be a circumstance when 
an outright ban of health claims would be possible. 
Similarly, the Pearson I court also required a disclaimer for 
the fourth claim that was outright rejected by the FDA, where 
the agency had banned the statement “0.8 mg of folic acid in a 
dietary supplement is more effective in reducing the risk of 
neural tube defects than a lower amount in foods in common 
form.”245  In justification, the court relied on one study that 
concluded that “[l]osses [of folic acid] in cooking and canning 
[foods] can be very high due to heat destruction.”246  This 
evidence was not pertinent to the claim because it had nothing to 
do with the effectiveness of folic acid in nutritional supplements 
and no study assessed the effectiveness of folic acid in nutritional 
supplements.  Therefore, the claim should not have been allowed 
at all, because it was not supported by evidence. 
The Pearson I court incorrectly determined that the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative 
Procedure Act required the FDA to explain why a disclosure was 
not able to remedy the misleading claims,247 as there was no 
evidence in direct support of the claims.  In addition, this court 
used its own interpretation of highly scientific evidence,248 even 
though the Supreme Court has held that a high level of agency 
deference is especially important when there is a challenge to “an 
evaluation of complex scientific data within the agency’s  
 
 
 
 
244 Pearson I, 164 F.3d at 658. 
245 Id. at 658–59. 
246 Id. at 659 (alteration in original) (quoting DIET AND HEALTH: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR REDUCING CHRONIC DISEASE RISK 67 (Committee on Diet and Health, Food and 
Nutrition Board 1989)). 
247 Id. at 660. 
248 Id. at 658–59. 
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technical expertise,” 249 and although the judicial branch is not to 
“undertake comparative evaluations of conflicting scientific 
evidence.”250 
The holdings of Pearson II, Pearson III, and Whitaker v. 
Thompson, which are the progeny of the Court of Appeals 
decision in Pearson I and which required the FDA to issue 
disclaimers instead of banning those health claims, were 
improperly decided for the same reasons given for Pearson I.  
Further, Pearson II expanded on the Pearson I court’s improper 
examination of the scientific evidence to show its disagreement 
with how the FDA weighed the evidence and, in doing so, ignored 
precedent from the Supreme Court.251  In fact, this very court 
went against its pronouncement just three years earlier, when it 
had properly applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Baltimore 
Gas & Electric stating that agency deference is especially 
necessary when evaluating “complex scientific data within the 
agency’s technical expertise.”252  The Pearson II court justified its 
actions with statements such as it was merely undertaking “a 
cursory examination of the scientific literature” and that “[t]he 
mere absence of significant affirmative evidence in support of a 
particular claim . . . does not translate into negative evidence 
‘against’ it.”253  Both quotes contradict the law.  The evidentiary 
frameworks of significant scientific agreement and credible 
evidence are necessary to weigh all available evidence to 
determine if the claim is misleading or not.  But, not having 
evidence to support a claim does not negate evidence to support a 
ban.  Finally, the Pearson II court claimed that a disclaimer was 
necessary if there was any credible evidence at all to support the 
health claim,254 even though Pearson I specifically stated that it 
was possible for the FDA to determine that a disclaimer will not 
cure a claim where evidence in support of the claim is weaker 
than evidence against it.255 
 
 
249 See Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I (trial court)), 14 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15 (D.D.C. 
1998) (citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 
103 (1983)). 
250 Id. 
251 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson II), 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 114 (D.D.C. 2001). 
252 Pearson I (trial court), 14 F. Supp. 2d at 15. 
253 Pearson II, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 115. 
254 Id. at 118. 
255 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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The Whitaker court also discussed the amount of evidence 
needed to deny a health claim, stating an example that the 
Pearson I court gave for evidence being qualitatively weaker than 
contrary evidence defined a very narrow parameter for when a 
claim may be denied.256  Whitaker also noted that the 
government’s standard was to prove its action of banning 
disclaimers was the least restrictive means of achieving its 
goal.257  However, the standard set out in Central Hudson was 
whether the fit between the government’s ends and the means 
chosen to accomplish those ends is not necessarily perfect, but 
reasonable.258  In addition, the Whitaker court, like the Pearson 
courts, did not follow Supreme Court precedent by not deferring 
to the FDA’s expertise.259 
Aside from the FDA’s denial of the health claims in the 
Pearson cases and in Whitaker for lack of sufficient evidence, 
there are studies concluding that consumers are confused about 
label claims.  These studies have found that consumers do not 
trust the current label scheme.260  There is precedent for allowing 
studies to be submitted as evidence in courts.  Courts have 
accepted evidence from studies and anecdotes from areas outside 
the jurisdiction of the court.261  Perhaps the results of those 
studies may be coupled with cases such as Williams v. Gerber 
Products Co., where the Ninth Circuit held that “reasonable 
consumers” are not expected to “look beyond” the front of a 
product label “to discover the truth,”262 to prove that incomplete 
health claims are actually misleading to consumers and should 
be banned.  Either way, the best course of action is to defer to the 
FDA and its expertise to carefully review health claims for 
purposes of protecting the public.  The front of the package is 
likely the only place the majority of consumers will look for 
 
256 Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10–11 n.10 (D.D.C. 2002) (stating 
that a complete ban would be reasonable when “evidence in support of the claim is 
qualitatively weaker than evidence against the claim – for example, where the claim 
rests on only one or two old studies.”) (emphasis omitted). 
257 Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 9. 
258 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
259 Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 11. 
260 See supra Part IV.B. 
261 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1986). 
262 Williams v. Gerber Prod. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939–40 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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nutrition information.263  Further, there is evidence that a health 
claim must be succinct in order to be effective, and brevity is not 
possible when supporting evidence is weak, as evidenced by the 
lengthy disclaimers the FDA crafted in the Alliance I and 
Alliance II cases as described below.  For those reasons, the FDA 
must have the ability to ban speech without the use of a 
disclaimer to a higher degree than current case law allows. 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
also rejected the precisely accurate summary of evidence that the 
FDA included in its disclaimers in two fairly recent cases, 
holding that the language was too detailed to survive the 
reasonable fit prong of Central Hudson.264  The fourth part of the 
Central Hudson test requires there be a reasonable fit between 
the government’s objective and the restriction,265 which one 
would think would be satisfied by limiting disclaimer language 
exactly to the available evidence regarding the claim at question.  
In fact, in order to assure compliance, the FDA guidance 
procedures for qualified health claims unequivocally state that a 
disclaimer “should include qualifying language that identifies 
limits to the level of scientific evidence . . . with specificity and 
accuracy.”266  In the first of two cases, Alliance I, the plaintiffs’ 
claim stated that “[s]elenium may reduce the risk of prostate 
cancer.  Scientific evidence supporting this claim is convincing 
but not yet conclusive.”267  After a thorough review of the 
evidence, the FDA found only two out of nine studies suggested 
that “[s]elenium may reduce the risk of prostate cancer.”268  Then 
the FDA issued the following disclaimer which mirrored their 
evidentiary findings: “Two weak studies suggest that selenium 
intake may reduce the risk of prostate cancer.  However, four 
stronger studies and three weak studies showed no reduction in 
risk.  Based on these studies, FDA concludes that it is highly 
unlikely that selenium supplements reduce the risk of prostate 
 
263 INT’L FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, supra note 143, at 34; Edge 
et al., supra note 115, at 851 (describing the above study and also providing the data 
in table form). 
264 All. for Nat. Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 71 (D.D.C. 2010); 
All. for Nat. Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2011). 
265 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
266 Evidence-Based Review System, supra note 43, at § H. 
267 All. For Nat. Health U.S., 714 F. Supp. 2d at 57 n.16. 
268 Id. at 70–71. 
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cancer.”269  The court held that such a disclaimer effectively 
negated the claim and as such the reasonable fit test of Central 
Hudson was violated.270  In doing so, the court discounted the fact 
that the disclaimer precisely and accurately summarized the 
evidence per the mandated FDA guidelines noted above.  The 
same may be said of the second case, Alliance II, where the court 
rejected two FDA disclaimers that were similar in detail because 
the claims failed to satisfy the reasonable fit requirement of the 
Central Hudson test.271  Again, these disclaimers precisely stated 
the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence as reviewed by the 
expertise of the FDA.272  What better fit could there be than 
including precisely accurate evidence in a disclaimer?  The law 
should permit the FDA to provide disclaimers that accurately 
describe the evidence, regardless of whether the manufacturer’s 
claim is negated. 
Finally, a district court within the Second Circuit ruled on 
this issue.273  Although this court allowed the FDA to accurately 
summarize the evidence in its disclaimer,274 the court struck 
down the disclaimer for other language.275  This underscores how 
difficult it has become for the FDA to protect consumers.  In 
addition, since the case was decided in district court, it is of 
limited precedential value.  In this case, a plaintiff posited the 
claim “that drinking green tea ‘may reduce the risk of breast or 
prostate cancer.’ ”276  The FDA evaluated the evidence and found 
that two of three breast cancer studies showed no link between 
 
269 Id. at 71. 
270 Id. 
271 All. for Nat. Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2011). 
272 Id. at 11, 23–24. One of the two plaintiffs’ health claims that the FDA 
determined required a disclaimer was: “Vitamin E may reduce the risk of bladder 
cancer. The scientific evidence for this claim is convincing, but not conclusive.” The 
FDA’s disclaimer for this claim stated: “One small study suggests that Vitamin E 
supplements may reduce the risk of bladder cancer. However, two small studies 
showed no reduction of risk. Based on these studies, FDA concludes that it is highly 
unlikely that vitamin E supplements reduce the risk of bladder cancer.” Id. at 23–24. 
The other health claim stated that “Vitamin C may reduce the risk of gastric cancer. 
The scientific evidence supporting this claim is persuasive, but not conclusive.” The 
FDA disclaimer for this claim was: “One weak study and one study with inconsistent 
results suggest that vitamin C supplements may reduce the risk of gastric cancer. 
Based on these studies, FDA concludes that it is highly uncertain that vitamin C 
supplements reduce the risk of gastric cancer.” Id. at 24.  
273 See generally Fleminger, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 854 
F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Conn. 2012). 
274 Id. at 217. 
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276 Id. at 195. 
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green tea and lower breast cancer rates, and a third study found 
a positive benefit in a very limited population.277  The FDA found 
“very limited credible evidence” for the claim in the prostate 
cancer studies.278  Thus, the FDA determined that the claim 
required a disclaimer.279  Although this court held that the 
disclaimer language accurately summarized the evidentiary 
findings, it held that an extra sentence in the disclaimer claiming 
that the “FDA does not agree that green tea may reduce that 
risk” was considered to be too restrictive and in violation of the 
reasonable fit test.280   
This case should give the FDA hope, however.  Just as the 
judges here turned to other decisions for guidance—up until this 
case, they were all from courts within the D.C. Circuit—and then 
reasonably held that it was appropriate for the FDA to provide a 
precise summary of the evidence in the disclaimer, a court in 
another jurisdiction could turn to this case for guidance and 
decide to do the same.  Given the confusion over front-of-package 
labeling schemes that currently exists, how can effective and 
believable disclaimers be crafted in cases where there is no direct 
evidence to support the health claims or where disclaimer 
language is restricted?  Will a large number of consumers 
mistakenly believe that since the FDA has authored a 
disclaimer—even those disclaimers where the FDA was forced to 
edit out strong verbiage—it is also endorsing the product?281  The 
average consumer may conclude that if the FDA did not believe 
the claim was properly worded based on the available scientific 
evidence then it would not have allowed it to appear on the label.  
Further, the average consumer likely does not know the FDA, 
which is charged with assuring consumers that we can rely on 
information contained on our food labels, is required to provide 
disclaimers against its better judgment, or is required to modify 
its disclaimer language by using verbiage it disagrees with, based 
on its expert analysis of the evidence.  For these reasons, it is a 
bad idea to greatly curtail the FDA’s ability to ban claims. 
Courts have been inconsistent in their treatment of evidence 
used to prove that speech is potentially misleading.  Although 
mere conjecture by the government will not suffice as evidence, 
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2018] SOLVING THE CRAZY MAZE OF FOOD LAWS 273 
courts have determined that evidence may consist of references 
to studies and anecdotes from areas outside the jurisdiction of 
the court.282  However, in Association of National Advertisers, Inc. 
v. Lungren, the court needed only two examples of evidence to 
determine that speech was potentially misleading: (1) a plastic 
bag labeled “recyclable” but could only be recycled if it was 
returned to South Carolina; and (2) a disposable diaper labeled 
“biodegradable” although it would take several hundred years for 
it to biodegrade.283  Similarly, in Friedman v. Rogers, the 
Supreme Court noted that the governing body in question was 
merely familiar with past abuses and that was enough evidence 
to determine that the speech was misleading.284  In Ackerman v. 
Coca-Cola Co., the court found evidence of misleading speech in 
the text of the FDA’s existing regulations.285  It appears that all 
of these examples belie the tough stand that the D.C. Circuit has 
taken to repeatedly deny FDA disclaimer language, especially in 
light of Central Hudson.  According to the first prong of Central 
Hudson, communication may be banned if it is “more likely to 
deceive the public than to inform it.”286  A rational analysis 
would, for instance, allow a claim to be banned if the majority of 
the evidence is weighed against it.  In fact, the court in Pearson I 
stated that such was a possibility.287  The Pearson I court also left 
open the idea that the government could possibly prove that 
disclaimers would confuse the public.288 
The second prong of Central Hudson, a substantial 
government interest, is met in health claims disputes where the 
government’s mission is to protect the “health, safety, and 
welfare of its citizens” and to protect citizens from misleading 
advertising.289 
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at *15–16 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
286 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 
(1980). 
287 Pearson v. Shalala (Pearson I), 164 F.3d 650, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Nor do 
we rule out the possibility that where evidence in support of a claim is outweighed 
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ban it outright.”). 
288 Id. at 659–60. 
289 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 484–85 (1995) (finding a 
substantial government interest existed when a statute prohibited beer labels from 
listing alcohol content because the statute protected the “health, safety, and welfare 
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The third prong of Central Hudson, whether the regulation 
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, also 
requires that the government provide evidence.  Lungren stated 
that this prong was satisfied if the fit between the government’s 
interest and the restriction is “simply reasonable.”290  In Lungren, 
the court held that the legislature’s belief that uniform standards 
would promote consumer protection was enough to directly 
advance the governmental interest.291  Similarly, the Lungren 
trial court cited to the Supreme Court case Posadas v. Tourism 
Co. of Puerto Rico for its acceptance of the legislature’s belief 
regarding casino gambling advertising.292  Further, the court in 
Joseph accepted the legislative history of the law as evidence 
that this prong was met.293 
The court in Pearson I held that the fourth prong of Central 
Hudson, whether the fit between the government’s ends and the 
means chosen to accomplish those ends is reasonable, was not 
met because the use of a disclaimer was a reasonable less-
restrictive means than an outright ban of the claims in 
question.294 
Notwithstanding the prior analysis of Pearson I, which 
concluded that the FDA should not have had to issue disclaimers 
in the first place, the court’s claim that a less-restrictive means 
was required is not accurate.  Courts have determined that the 
fourth prong does not require that the government act with the 
least restrictive means available to it.  The Joseph court rejected 
such an argument by the plaintiff in response to a state banning 
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the phrase “board certified” from physician advertisements.295  In 
Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox, the 
government banned Tupperware parties in student dorm rooms 
because of their commercial element.296  The Supreme Court 
noted the least restrictive means of regulating commercial speech 
need not be chosen, and the government will determine the best 
method for regulating such speech.297  In City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc., the dissenting justices of the Supreme 
Court stated the claim that the government was required to 
choose a less restrictive means of regulating commercial speech 
had been “discredited,” and that the cases which held that the 
government’s restrictions failed the fourth prong of the Central 
Hudson test were “substantially excessive, disregarding far less 
restrictive and more precise means.”298 
IV. SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS 
Food laws must be streamlined to become an effective tool 
for consumer protection.  Eliminating unnecessary and confusing 
laws is directly in line with the current administration’s edict to 
cut bureaucracy. 
Many authors have eloquently argued for sundry logical 
changes to food laws, such as the FDA relying less on guidance 
documents and more on the notice and comment provision of § 
553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.299  Many other 
reasonable changes could be made.  For example, Winters 
advocates for state regulation of health claims and the repeal of 
the health and nutrient content claims provisions of the NLEA, 
which would save federal money.300  Mortazavi suggests that 
allowing individual lawsuits would force change in the 
industry.301  Mortazavi illustrates this point by highlighting 
recent litigation on the use of the term “natural,” which 
convinced companies who were not part of the litigation to 
voluntarily drop the term from their labels.302  Mortazavi 
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recognized that individual lawsuits allow for public involvement 
in food law policy, which is necessary for government 
accountability and also serves as a means of instituting positive 
change for consumers.303  Paben suggests that a federal private 
right of action be added to the FDCA, which would enhance the 
FDA’s control over food laws.304  Zarski argues that courts should 
interpret the NLEA preemption provision more narrowly so that 
a higher number of misleading label claims could be brought in 
state courts.305  Zarski notes that 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1) bars all 
false or misleading label claims, thus suggesting that all state 
law claims for misleading labels should be allowed under existing 
law.306 
The sheer number of reasonable solutions that have been 
posited over the past several years are staggering and there are 
far too many to implement.  There needs to be a workable 
solution created from the surplus of solutions recently offered.  
This Article’s proposed improvements to food laws will be limited 
to establishing a simple mandatory front-of-package labeling 
scheme that will include: (1) eliminating structure/function 
claims; (2) greatly revising and simplifying nutrition content 
claims laws; (3) having the FDA issue letter grades for products 
based on evidence of health claims while allowing agreed-on 
health claims language to appear on the label; and (4) deferring 
to the expertise of the FDA in the courts. 
Although some of the Article’s solutions are not new, the 
specific combination is unique and will greatly enhance the 
FDA’s ability as a primary consumer advocate organization. 
Paben calls for the FDA to change its regulations to ensure 
better, uniform food laws that are less confusing to consumers.307  
Negowetti suggests that the FDA require the significant 
scientific agreement standard for all label claims. 308  Thus, we 
 
303 Id. at 931–32, 975. 
304 Paben, supra note 74, at 209–10. 
305 Sylvia Zarski, Comment, Can You Judge Your Food By Looking At Its Cover? 
How Courts’ Application of Federal Preemption Allows Misleading Food Labeling to 
Slip Through the Regulatory Cracks, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 1119, 1120, 1137 (2015). 
306 Id. at 1137. 
307 Paben, supra note 74, at 175. 
308 Nicole E. Negowetti, Food Labeling Litigation: Exposing Gaps in the FDA’s 
Resources and Regulatory Authority, GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS 2 (June 
2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Negowetti_Food-
Labeling-Litigation.pdf. 
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should simply require FDA pre-approval of all label claims.309  
This will serve to eliminate the confusion caused by having 
multiple claims schemes.  The current rules and guidelines for 
structure/function claims are confusing and rarely complied 
with.310  For instance, the statement “improves joint mobility and 
reduces inflammation” is not allowed because it implies a cure for 
rheumatoid arthritis, but the statement “improves 
absentmindedness” is allowed because, although many 
consumers may equate that statement with a treatment for 
Alzheimer’s disease, absentmindedness is also characteristic of 
non-disease symptoms.311  For these reasons, structure/function 
claims are inherently misleading to consumers.  It would be 
better if such claims were prohibited. 
Nutrient content claims allow manufacturers to describe the 
level of nutrients in a product, on its label, if the FDA defined the 
level—these are levels such as “low in,” “high in,” reduced, lite; 
e.g., “low in fat.”312  The laws regarding nutrient content claims 
should be greatly streamlined,313 to comply with a new 
mandatory front-of-package labeling scheme, which along with 
restructured health claims laws, described below, make the 
current nutrition content claims scheme obsolete. 
The new nutrition content scheme will eliminate confusion 
by limiting the number of nutrition content messages that 
appear on the front of the package and utilizing short, concise 
statements.  Currey proposed that the FDA should mandate 
front-of-package disclosures for certain potentially harmful 
ingredients when products contain more than the daily value of 
those ingredients.314  Currey argued that sugar and sodium levels 
 
309 Matthew W. Lindsey, Comment, Dietary Supplements and Structure-
Function Claims: The Dysfunctional Structure of Current Regulation, 5 J. FOOD L. & 
POL’Y 201, 220 (2009) (suggesting pre-market approval for all dietary supplements, 
not for the claims being made about the supplements and not for food products). 
310 LEVINSON, supra note 183, at 16.  
311 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: Structure/Function 
Claims, Small Entity Compliance Guide (Jan 9, 2002), https://www.fda.gov/Food/ 
GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/ucm103340.htm. 
312 Label Claims, supra note 38. 
313 Marion Nestle & David S. Ludwig, Front-of-Package Food Labels: Public 
Health or Propaganda?, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 771, 772 (2010) (although not 
advocating for a revision of nutrient content claims laws, the authors suggest the 
elimination of all front-of-package claims should be considered); Winters, supra note 
300, at 817, 867. 
314 Currey, supra note 16, at 1282–83, 1303–05; see Szanyi, supra note 11, at 
181–82 (Syznyi recognized the value on a front-of-package labeling system “from a 
psychological standpoint.” He noted that the objective of front-of-package labeling is 
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should be required.315  Along that same line, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) recognized that front-of-
package labeling would be most effective if the information is 
limited to the most important health-related nutrients, 
considering the need for more uniformity in front-of-package 
schemes caused by the many different ways that manufacturers 
present information.316  The Institute of Medicine recommends 
that front of the package labels include unhealthful amounts of 
calories, sugars, saturated fats, and sodium levels be required if 
one of these ingredients exceeded the daily value by a certain 
percentage.317  Hayes suggests only having a requirement for 
nutrition claims for offending ingredients, and not allowing 
beneficial claims at all.318  This is in line with Kozup’s 
experiments which concluded the Nutrition Facts panel, on the 
back of the product, is the best place for positive product 
information to appear.319  Since a front-of-package labeling 
scheme must include just a few ingredients, the FDA should not 
allow the inclusion of beneficial claims, such as “low in sodium.”  
Only negative nutrition claims (or more accurately, negative 
nutrition disclaimers) for a few important ingredients should be 
required on the label.  It is sufficient to flag sugars, saturated 
fats, sodium levels, and calories that are well above the 
recommended daily value established by the Institute of 
Medicine.  Doing so quickly alerts those consumers who must 
watch their food intake of the risks involved with eating certain 
foods.  Health-conscious consumers will already scour the 
Nutrition Facts panel on the back of the product for healthful 
 
to provide a small amount of information in one prominent place, which “squares 
with what we know about the limits of human attention.”). 
315 Currey, supra note 16, at 1308–10. Currey states that if at least 20% of the 
total carbohydrates in a product come from sugars, then the disclaimer “High in 
Sugar” must  be used on the label. Currey also stated that trans fats should be 
identified too, but these have subsequently been banned by the FDA. Id. 
316 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, FRONT-OF-PACKAGE 
NUTRITION RATING SYSTEMS AND SYMBOLS: PHASE I REPORT 1, 1–3 (Ellen A. 
Wartella, et al., eds., 2010), https://www.nap.edu/read/12957/chapter/1#x. 
317 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, FRONT-OF-PACKAGE 
NUTRITION RATING SYSTEMS AND SYMBOLS: PROMOTING HEALTHIER CHOICES 4 
(ELLEN A. WARTELLA, ET AL., eds., 2012), https://www.nap.edu/download/13221. The 
report also calls for a listing for trans fats, which have subsequently been banned by 
the FDA. Id. 
318 Kathryn E. Hayes, Note, Front-of-Package Nutrition Claims: Trustworthy 
Facts or Deceptive Marketing? Closing the Loopholes in Labeling, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 545, 573–75 (2013). 
319 Kozup et al., supra note 148. 
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information.  But those who are not necessarily healthy eaters 
likely will not view the Nutrition Facts panel and therefore 
would find the negative information on the front useful.  This 
scheme clearly places consumers on alert for critical negative 
ingredient information while still providing a means of 
identifying positive product attributes by viewing the Nutrition 
Facts panel on the back of the product.  By expanding on 
Currey’s scheme, the current practice of selectively including 
only favorable information on the front of the package will be 
eliminated.320  Not only would these ingredient listings be the 
most helpful information to consumers, but limiting the list to 
just a few ingredients would minimize or eliminate confusion. 
Mandatory nutrition content disclosures would replace the 
currently allowed claims.  They would be worded more directly 
than the “See nutrition information for _____ content” disclosure 
that is currently required if a product contains more than a 
certain level of fat, cholesterol, or sodium.321  The current 
disclosure language leaves the burden of discovering nutrient 
deficiencies on the reader who has to think to check the 
Supplement Facts label on the back of the product.  Front-of-
package disclosures should be direct statements that leave no 
doubt of the nutrient deficiency.  Research concluded that short 
claims are more effective than long claims.322  For products that 
contain levels of the above-mentioned ingredients higher than 
the daily value, Currey suggests that the mandatory disclosure 
language should simply be “High in _____,”323 with the offending 
ingredient in the blank space.  The FDA should consider using 
two categories here—“high” and “very high.”  The FDA has 
already established a baseline of 20 percent above the daily value 
as being “high”324 and there is no reason to discard that 
definition.  I suggest that a second category of “very high” should 
also be used, leaving the FDA to define the term.  This would 
incentivize manufactures to lower the level of harmful 
ingredients in their products. 
 
 
320 Currey, supra note 16, at 1302–04. 
321 21 C.F.R. § 101.13 (h)(1) (2016). 
322 Wansink et al., supra note 181, at 10–11. 
323 Currey, supra note 16, at 1308. 
324 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., A Food Labeling Guide. Guidance For Industry 91 
app’x B, https://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/guidancedocumentsregulatory 
information/ucm2006828.htm (last updated Jan. 2013). 
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As others note, the health claims scheme also requires 
modification.325  The introduction of a simple letter grade system 
for health claims would help eliminate the confusion caused by 
structure/function claims and nutrition content claims.  Because 
consumers are familiar with letter grades, the FDA should assign 
a letter grade to every health claim based on the level of evidence 
that exists in support or opposition to the health claim.  The 
letter grades would be prominently placed on the front label of 
the product, next to the health claim.  In 2009, the FDA 
experimented with a grading scheme in which unqualified health 
claims received an A grade since they were supported by 
significant scientific agreement, and qualified claims received 
grades from B through D, with a brief statement that the FDA 
had assigned the grade based on the evidence.326  The letter grade 
experiment showed some success.327  Evidence from an earlier 
FDA report card experiment suggested that having fewer letter 
grades would help consumers properly identify the strength of 
evidence in support of a claim328 and it would be up to the FDA to 
consider such a modified grading scheme. Additionally, a grading 
scheme, which incentivizes manufacturers to achieve a high 
grade, places the burden and cost of testing on the manufacturers 
who see 50% profit margins on supplements.329 
 
325 Winters, supra note 300, at 859, 861, 867 (suggesting to eliminate NLEA’s 
health and nutrition content claims provisions); Pomeranz, supra note 87, at 646 
(suggesting that congress require preauthorization for claims and that the FDA 
work together with the food industry to develop a claims database); David C. 
Vladeck, Devaluing Truth: Unverified Health Claims in the Aftermath of Pearson v. 
Shalala, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 535, 542–52 (1999) (“Unverified [h]ealth [c]laims 
[i]nherently [a]re [m]isleading.”); Monika Jankowska, U.S. Food Labelling 
Regulations vs. Freedom of Speech – Creation of “Qualified Health Claims,” 12 EUR. 
FOOD & FEED L. REV. 142, 150 (2017) (“[F]reedom of expression should not be used 
to protect bad science.”). 
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699.htm (last updated Jan. 3, 2018). This grading scheme was one of three schemes 
evaluated in the study to determine the effectiveness of conveying the scientific 
evidence supporting health claims. Id.; Derby & Levy, supra note 182, at 36 
(suggesting giving products with unqualified health claims an A grade). 
327 Choinière & Verrill, supra note 326. 
328 2004 Qualified Health Claims Research Executive Summary, 
FOODINSIGHT.ORG (Apr. 25, 2010), http://www.foodinsight.org/2004_Qualified_ 
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329 See Dickens, supra note 9, at 592–93, 595–96 (discussing how the European 
Union requires manufacturers to adequately prove that their products are safe); see 
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Using a well-recognized grading scheme will provide 
certainty to the consumer in two meaningful ways.  First, only 
one entity would assign the grade, not manufacturers or trade 
associations.  Second, the governing agency tasked with 
consumer protection, not the manufacturer,330 assigns the grade.  
However, the grading scheme may run afoul of commercial 
speech laws that recently arose when the FDA attempted to deny 
qualified health claims, as discussed in Part IV.C.  Therefore, 
health claims should be allowed on the label—except if a total 
ban is appropriate— subject to disclaimer modifications by the 
FDA.  In addition, the courts should give the FDA strong agency 
deference in analyzing its evidence, as per Auer v. Robbins.331  In 
that way, letter grades would not replace the text of health 
claims, and the FDA would be allowed to signal to consumers the 
strength of the claim by way of a simple format that is supported 
by the FDA’s evidentiary standards. 
The use of this new health claims scheme would require the 
FDA to spot test products that are on the market, which would 
require additional funding.  To the extent that this would require 
additional resources and staffing, Dickens has several 
suggestions that would help.  She suggests the FDA could reward 
states if they assist in its regulatory efforts, for instance 
providing product-testing facilities for the FDA to use.332  Dickens 
also suggests that tax incentives could encourage relevant state 
and federal agencies to “pool their budgets to help test dietary 
supplements.”333 
The FDA should also focus efforts on approving qualified 
health claims as another means of streamlining the process.334  
Under the new scheme, all products with qualified health claims 
would automatically receive an A letter grade.  In those 
instances, there is no lengthy, complicated FDA process to 
navigate or the possibility of ensuing lawsuits over claim denials 
because of weight of evidence issues. 
 
also Lindsey, supra note 309, at 220 (assuring supplement safety via premarket 
approval would be the financial burden of manufacturers). 
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Finally, courts have misinterpreted First Amendment 
commercial speech laws relating to health claims.  Courts have 
misinterpreted the law by holding that FDA disclaimers are too 
strongly worded and wholly negate the health claim of the 
plaintiffs—even with accurate and precise language based on an 
expert summary of the evidence.  Courts challenged the expertise 
of the FDA in denying its decision to disallow a claim when it 
was not supported by credible evidence. Courts have misapplied 
the FDA’s evidentiary standard.  Admittedly, these limiting cases 
are all from one jurisdiction (courts within the D.C. Circuit), but 
a promising case having been decided in a court within the 
Second Circuit.  Nonetheless, the FDA must be allowed to 
properly protect the public from misleading health claims by 
exercising the highest degree of administrative deference as 
recognized for administrative agencies in Auer v. Robbins.335  The 
Article’s proposed improvements to food laws will have a 
profound positive effect on the convoluted, detailed, and crazy 
maze of food label and claims laws that currently exist.  By 
establishing a simple mandatory front-of-package labeling 
scheme that will include: (1) eliminating structure/function 
claims; (2) greatly revising and simplifying nutrition content 
claims laws; (3) having the FDA issue letter grades for products 
based on evidence of health claims while allowing agreed-on 
health claims language to appear on the label; and (4) deferring 
to the expertise of the FDA in the courts, consumer protection 
will be greatly enhanced. 
CONCLUSION 
The FDA has the burdensome but crucial task of ensuring 
that our food is safe and adequately represented in the 
marketplace.  Currently, food laws are ineffective and strip the 
FDA of the clout it needs to be a proper watchdog agency.  As a 
result, the FDA is far less effective.  By improving food laws and 
prioritizing FDA actions, a more consumer-oriented agency will 
emerge to provide adequate protections for unsuspecting 
consumers.  Our nation is fortunate enough to have the resources 
to make this critical change a reality.  The question is whether 
we have the ability to transcend political and industry forces to 
make it a priority. 
 
335 519 U.S. at 461. 
